

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
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Remarks

Executive Secretary  
9 Nov 84

Date

3637 (10-81)

**IMMEDIATE**

Form 3-65 16C

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8430686-8430687-8430688

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 9, 1984

84- 9885

~~SECRET~~

TO : NSC - Mr. Robert Kimmitt  
 CIA -   
 USIA - Mr. C. William LaSalle

25X1

SUBJECT : IPC Meeting on UNESCO, November 9, 1984, 2:00 p.m.  
 REF : Charles Hill Memorandum of November 2, 1984, on UNESCO Strategy

The meeting of the IPC that is alluded to in the November 2, 1984, Charles Hill Memorandum, an IPC charged to evaluate such reform as UNESCO might have achieved during 1984, will meet on November 9, 1984, at 2:00 p.m., to hold a preliminary discussion. This will include a review of 1984 events and occurrences. The proposed agenda is attached (Tab A).

The following background materials are also provided, inasmuch as they formulate our commitment to monitor and review, and relate directly to the question whether or not the requisite concrete changes have materialized during 1984, and whether, thus, a Presidential review is called for:

- Decision Memorandum of December 23, 1983 (Tab B);
- Shultz/M'Bow Correspondence (Tab C);
- NSC/State Department Communications (Tab D);
- Newell Letter to M'Bow, July 13, 1984, making detailed suggestions for concrete UNESCO reform (Tab E).

Additional materials will be provided subsequently--as they may be needed in light of the proposed findings and advice of the Monitoring Panel; or to consider other inputs that may come to be relevant; or as the IPC may itself determine.

*Covey*  
 Charles Hill  
 Executive Secretary

Attachments  
 as stated.

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE (IPC)  
UNESCO

November 9, 2:00 p.m.  
Room 7240, Main State

AGENDA

1. Opening Remarks - Under Secretary Armacost, Chairman
  2. Review of Events - Assistant Secretary Newell
  3. Discussion: IPC Membership
  4. Discussion: Materials Submitted for Consideration
    - Decision Memorandum of December 23, 1983
    - Shultz/M'Bow Correspondence
    - NSC/State Department Communications
    - Newell Letter to M'Bow, July 13, 1984, making detailed suggestions for concrete reform.
  5. Discussion: Further Materials Needed for Consideration
    - CIA Report on the impact of our UNESCO withdrawal\*\*\*
    - GAO Draft Proposed Report on UNESCO's Management, Budgeting and Personnel Practices\*\*
    - UNESCO Monitoring Panel Report\*
    - IO Analysis of 1984 UNESCO reform efforts\*
  6. Discussion: Materials Providing Informational Background
    - House Foreign Affairs Committee report on UNESCO\*
    - Report by 5 Members of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO\*\*
  7. Schedule of future IPC meetings
- \* In preparation  
\*\* To be provided at meeting  
\*\*\* To be provided separately by CIA

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear George:


As the end of the year draws closer, so too does our decision about whether our withdrawal from UNESCO is final, or whether we choose instead to renew our membership. As a scientist, I would like to offer my assessment of the implications of formalizing our withdrawal from UNESCO.

Frankly, I think that it would be in the long-term interest of international science for the U.S. to leave UNESCO. The corruption, bureaucracy and politicization of UNESCO that has plagued other UNESCO programs also plagues the science programs. Only a small portion of UNESCO science programs are involved in what we consider real science. A large portion are short-term, quasi-development programs that train Third World technicians instead of scientists. I believe that the original intent of UNESCO--the free exchange of knowledge and talent as a means of accelerating industrial development and improving the quality of life in the Third World--was correct and worthwhile. That intent, sadly, has been lost.

It will take some effort, but in the long run I think we can strengthen other existing mechanisms for the conduct of international science and the propagation of the fruits of science and technology to the developing world. As part of that mechanism, I would suggest that the U.S. contributions to international science be administered through the science agencies of the U.S. government, with oversight by State, as appropriate. This would help restore and maintain the emphasis on substance that UNESCO was originally intended to engender.

The various science bureaucracies in the U.S. have a stake in continued U.S. participation in UNESCO, and thus advocate that we remain active participants. Perhaps, had the many reform efforts of the last 11 months led to results, I might have agreed. However, since significant reform does not seem to have occurred, and considering the important relationship between science and international progress, clearly it is best for the U.S. to proceed with the President's decision to withdraw from UNESCO.

Yours truly,



G. A. Keyworth  
Science Advisor to the President

The Honorable George Schultz  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520



## Department of State

ACTION MEMORANDUM  
S/SCONFIDENTIAL

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: P - Mr. Eagleburger

FROM: IO - Gregory J. Newell

SUBJECT: U.S. Participation in the United Nations  
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization  
(UNESCO)

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to continue U.S. membership in UNESCO, given its declining effectiveness, and its long-standing adverse impact on U.S. interests.

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

For more than a decade, opinion leaders in the Executive branch and Congress, and among the informed public, have questioned the value of U.S. membership in UNESCO. In 1974, the Congress actually suspended payments to UNESCO, because of actions that denigrated the status of Israel.

UNESCO policies, for several years, have served anti-U.S. political ends. This Administration has frequently advised UNESCO of the limits of U.S. (and Western) toleration of misguided policy and programs, and budgetary mismanagement. For nearly three years we have applied to UNESCO the same priorities and criteria that guide our relations to all multilateral organizations. UNESCO alone, among the major multilateral organizations, has not responded constructively.

Six months ago, I commissioned an in-depth policy review of U.S. participation in UNESCO. At the same time, I directed that a special effort be made to describe our reasoned expectations as to policy, programs, budget and management at the biennial General Conference of UNESCO, which ended November 26, 1983.

Now, at the conclusion of this two-pronged effort to reassess, reason and rehabilitate, I have concluded that continued U.S. participation in UNESCO -- as it is currently organized, focused, and directed -- does not serve the interests of the United States. I recommend that you give notice, before December 31, 1983, as provided by UNESCO's constitution, that the United States will withdraw from

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membership, effective December 31, 1984. (A proposed letter giving the required notice is appended at Tab A. A memorandum from the Legal Adviser relative thereto is appended at Tab B.)

This careful and thorough policy review confirmed prior impressions that the Organization does have deep-seated problems. What appeared was a persistent pattern of:

- (1) extraneous politicization of virtually every subject dealt with: Israel, South Africa, human rights, disarmament, communications, etc.
- (2) an endemic hostility toward the basic institutions of a free society, especially a free market and a free press; and
- (3) the most irresponsible and unrestrained budgetary expansion in the United Nations system.

This was the obvious negative side of UNESCO, in which we could no longer acquiesce; but various UNESCO-sponsored conventions and arrangements have performed usefully. We asked ourselves whether there were irreplaceable UNESCO activities. If we withdrew, would our national interests be adversely affected in a significant way? We could not identify major UNESCO activities giving us important affirmative results that could not be obtained in some other way.

We have not overlooked the problems that might follow upon our departure from UNESCO, as that might relate to our participation in the UNESCO-sponsored Universal Copyright Convention, and the Beirut and Florence Agreements dealing with the international exchange of visual and auditory materials; nor problems possibly associated with our participation in the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, the International Hydrological Program, and the Man and the Biosphere program -- ad hoc UNESCO-sponsored initiatives promoting specific scientific inquiries. Genuinely needed scientific and commercial cooperation of this sort pre-dates the creation of UNESCO. A focus on particular matters in which participants find it useful to cooperate is more likely to produce useful results. We are confident that such cooperation will continue -- in other channels if need be. To such cooperation we would continue to contribute. The intrinsic significance of the work of U.S. nationals, universities, and business firms in science, education, publishing, and communications gives us considerable assurance that international practices with respect to all these matters (with or without UNESCO) will not leave U.S. interests out of account.

UNESCO conventions occasionally seek to provide benefits to members that are not provided to non-member states; but UNESCO

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and other UN agencies do not provide the only possible channels for cultural and commercial cooperation. It is possible to find means of working together to achieve particular desired ends outside of UNESCO. Given the fact that neither culture, commerce, nor world science can proceed meaningfully without the participation of U.S. nationals and American institutions, other cooperative arrangements will surely be activated -- and on a healthy non-ideological basis. Significant cultural interchange has always flowed best from the free contact of authors, scientists, artists and audiences with one another across national boundaries.

### Conclusions of our Evaluation:

(1) Politicization. UNESCO programs and personnel are heavily freighted with an irresponsible political content, and answer to an agenda that is consistently inimical to U.S. interests. The approach that UNESCO consistently takes to "disarmament" (which is not the proper concern of that forum) reflects either a specific pro-Soviet bias, or, at best, adheres to the naive and simplistic "Delhi Declaration" view. Human rights programs and resolutions in UNESCO are almost invariably infected with Soviet and statist concepts of alleged "collective rights," in denigration of personal and individual freedoms, privileges and immunities -- which are recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But UNESCO too often lends itself to the machinations of those who think that "collective rights" (including those of the state) are equal to, or more significant than, the rights of individuals. Anti-Israel attitudes, too, leading to still-maintained sanctions, are deeply rooted there.

More particularly, and in relation to specific elements of U.S. foreign policy, UNESCO parrots the product of an extreme and unproductive posturing on Southern Africa issues. It supports the PLO, SWAPO and the ANC, both financially and politically, and provides assistance to Cuba. In UNESCO proceedings, the United States is regularly pilloried -- much more sternly than is the Soviet Union for its repressive rule, or other totalitarian regimes for their brutal behavior. Recent slight improvements in these matters, as in the newly-concluded 1983 General Conference, are, we suspect, mere tactical or transitory exceptions to the now deeply-ingrained rule. Voluble UNESCO participants are persistently hostile to U.S. political views, values and interests. Our participation in UNESCO "consensus" can on occasion amount to complicity in villification of the U.S. -- which is part of everyday life there. The UNESCO environment is relentlessly hostile to our ideals, and this environment is unlikely to change, whatever reasonable effort we bring to bear.

(2) Organizing Orwellian "Freedom." The ordered freedom to which all aspire is not to be found in the Orwellian state.

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Various UN agencies, however, early sought to give life to their vision of a "New International Economic Order" (NIEO) -- compulsively statist and necessarily ineffectual. UNESCO functionaries soon undertook their own quest -- to create the "New World Information and Communication Order" (NWICO). The contemplated NWICO, in particular, would establish a program in which we must not acquiesce. It poses a real threat to the freedom of the press (given the common involvement of governments in telecommunications practice). We are, as you know, already obliged by specific statutory mandate to end our support for UNESCO if it takes certain actions restricting the freedom of the press. There is no sign that powerful elements within UNESCO have now abandoned advocacy of their cherished "New World Information and Communications Order." In this particular, we consistently fight against biased rules, much inimical to press freedom, but an occasional tactical retreat by the UNESCO establishment is the most we are likely ever to achieve. In line with the NWICO agenda, repression of a free press will persistently be advocated. This agenda, as Leonard Marks has noted, "is now with us and will be around for a long time in some form, whether we identify it or ignore it."

Yet another "New Order," also originally inspired by the NIEO, may be waiting to be born in Paris. A large number of UNESCO members have pressed for action to create a "code of conduct" controlling the operations of multinational corporations in UNESCO's various fields of interest. This would include the film, book publishing, and television industries. This initiative, with or without our opposition (and regardless whether we speak in or apart from UNESCO), will return again and again as circumstances seem propitious to its proponents. We must oppose such a movement; our conclusion is that we can better do so from without than from within. We simply cannot abide the constraints that UNESCO would likely seek to apply someday. We suggest that opposition from without -- principled and total opposition -- would be most forthright and effective.

(3) UNESCO Budgets and Management. UNESCO has far exceeded the "zero-growth" budget policy of the U.S. and the Geneva Group in that it initially proposed, for the 1984-85 biennium, a 9.7% program increase. This it did while all other UN agencies -- FAO, WHO, ILO, ITU, ICAO, WMO, WIPO, and others -- responded with zero or near-zero program growth. UNESCO was forced to "accept" a Nordic proposal for an alleged 2.5% increase (embodying a 3.8% - 5.5% budget increase for the next biennium in real terms).

UNESCO management practices are atrocious. It is widely accepted that only one dollar out of every five is allocated to programs -- and in using that remainder there is little program concentration. Meaningful priorities are neither established

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nor policed. There is no real system of evaluation. There are reams of misleading or impenetrable management information. Here we encounter politically motivated and anti-Western personnel practices. No serious effort is made either to control or cut back on conferences, meetings, publications, and other effluvia of a large and unfocused bureaucracy of some 2300 persons. The impact of new personnel practices just approved by the General Conference is unclear, but it appears that a new majority of posts are to be reserved for nations thought to be disadvantaged or formerly dependent. Discrimination against employment of Western officers and staff will thus escalate further. These budget and personnel practices, moreover, are used by the Director General to support his own rule, and to secure his own perquisites -- through his dispensing of program funds to countries whose support he seeks or rewards, and through the use of personnel appointments with like purpose and effect.

These problems, understandable to some degree in any international organization, exist in UNESCO to a far greater degree than elsewhere. In three years of consistent effort, this Administration has produced improvements elsewhere in the UN system -- in policy formulation and program development, in establishment of budget levels and in management practices -- but significant improvements have eluded us in UNESCO.

Our review was not cursory; neither was it prejudiced. We genuinely sought to determine how we could participate in UNESCO on any satisfactory terms; and simultaneously sought, in good faith, to persuade the Organization and its Director General that UNESCO had embarked on a counter-productive path. I personally met with him five times to discuss our concerns. He must appreciate that UNESCO has been given timely warning of our apprehensions and attitudes. In effecting our review, we solicited the views of 13 federal government agencies. We requested, and obtained, evaluation of UNESCO field projects from 77 of our overseas missions. Through the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, we also gathered input from the key private sector organizations in education, science, culture and communications. The accumulated material is extensive (and can be mined for further insights), but it is already clear that the specific benefits, services and accords implicit in useful international cooperation can be had at a far lower price than that of the obloquy we endure in Paris, and the \$50 million per year we are assessed as our 25% contribution to this now-ritualized condemnation of the Western World.

We must now make a careful assessment of the potential impact of our proposed action, and of the appropriate strategy for its implementation. (A "Balance Sheet" of Benefits from UNESCO membership is appended at Tab C; a Proposed Strategy for Disengagement from UNESCO is appended at Tab D.)

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A summary of our assessment of the impact of our proposed action, following upon the review described earlier, is:

- Membership in UNESCO damages and distorts the views, values and interests of the United States.
- Experience shows that the United States cannot change UNESCO substantially if it remains a member.
- The United States receives few benefits from UNESCO membership that it could not otherwise negotiate and obtain through other channels.
- Our influence in other UN agencies would be strengthened if we took the step of withdrawing from UNESCO.
- Foreign policy costs associated with withdrawal do not appear to be heavy. Many, not openly supportive, rely on the United States to provide leadership and to protect the interests of all democratic peoples. Our leadership will pay dividends in enhanced respect and in more responsible behavior by member states in other international forums.
- At home, as abroad, our commitment to international cooperation may well be more respected (and taken much more seriously) if we can succeed in providing incentives to those UN organizations that take the work of world cooperation seriously, but disincentives to those that impose upon us all an illiberal, unenlightened, and repressive rule of cultural regimentation.

The signal that a U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO would send to multilateral international organizations is not that the U.S. is bent upon withdrawal from multilateral affairs. It is, rather, that we seek effective, non-politicized, and particular means of achieving international cooperation and coordination. To the creation of that form of international cooperation we are committed. To further that end we would contribute both effort and resources -- prudently committed, to be wisely and impartially used.

A STRATEGY FOR WITHDRAWAL

Withdrawal from UNESCO would raise (as would the withdrawal of the United States from any specialized UN agency) a number of more comprehensive questions. The answers we give to some questions would naturally further our general policy purposes in multilateral international organizations; others would require us to provide reassurances to various interest groups:

- (1) Impact on the UN System. Withdrawal from UNESCO would likely have a salutary effect on other UN system agencies.

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For this to occur, however, we must carefully explain that we are not hereby undertaking a wider disengagement from the UN. Our concerns are with UNESCO. Our arguments originate in our experience there, and are related to behavior in (and of) that organization. We shall need to emphasize that we are strongly committed to the basic proposition reemphasized by President Reagan in his remarks to the UN on September 26, 1983. We seek, as we have sought, honest international cooperation. We want this to be effective cooperation.

(2) Acting in Concert with Friendly Countries. Although a number of UNESCO members (Switzerland, the Netherlands, the UK, FRG, and others) have applauded our hard look at UNESCO, none have said precisely what they would do if the U.S. were to withdraw. I suggest that we explain our decision to others, but that we not explicitly encourage others to follow us. We have no intention of destroying UNESCO. Let it live, for whatever good it may do, as individual participants therein may calculate their advantage. We are saying that we see little advantage for us in UNESCO. We can, however, anticipate some near certain reactions. We will witness:

- widespread interest in our review, and in the information and analysis that led us to our conclusions;
- pressure from some to soften our approach, and to entertain proposals for projected UNESCO actions that might cause us to relent (the French, Nordics, and others will probably volunteer as intermediaries for such negotiations);
- stronger support than ever for UNESCO by some states (Italy, Spain, and numbers of Arab and African states);
- other withdrawals, eventually, when it becomes clear that we do mean to go ahead.

The stance we adopt should reflect our actual process of decision. We have made this decision on the basis of our own evaluation of U.S. national interests.

(3) France and Israel. Both France and Israel will have to be dealt with tactfully, and at a high level -- France, because it is the UNESCO host country; Israel, because it has already expressed concern that any U.S. withdrawal would work against its interests within UNESCO. As to the French, we should recall the serious problems in the Organization with which we have both been concerned; we should stress that we are unwilling any longer to remain as a member of an organization producing so few constructive results. To the French, especially, we should stress that we are not encouraging others to follow us. In our discussions, Rich Burt has indicated his feeling that any problematical French reaction is containable.

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The Israelis have expressed concern that, with the United States absent, Israel would be eventually be ejected from UNESCO. We think that unlikely. To allay such fears, we can emphasize the gains that we (and they) can thereby reasonably foresee elsewhere in the UN system -- redounding to their benefit. In my consultations with Ambassador Sam Lewis (an IO predecessor of mine), he said that, while the Israelis would not like our withdrawal, they would, if it were done properly, "swallow hard" and understand our decision.

(4) U.S. Interest Groups. I have undertaken informally to assess the reaction of concerned State Department officials and some others to this decision. The recommendation I here make is supported by Kirkpatrick, McPherson, Derwinski, Abrams, Malone, McCormick, Dougan, and UNESCO Amb. Gerard. Various regional Assistant Secretaries, properly concerned, have been consulted. My findings, both in these consultations and from careful examination of materials gathered in the process of our policy review, is that there is a unanimous recognition, in and out of government, that UNESCO faces grave problems. But a common editorialist's reaction to the admitted problems is to suggest, resignedly, that we have no alternatives, and that we should put UNESCO on probation yet again. We do have other alternatives -- and UNESCO has already failed the probationary term we have extended for nearly three years.

It follows -- from this near-universal comprehension that there are serious problems at UNESCO -- that we would probably experience relatively little strong and sustained opposition to withdrawal. Nevertheless, we must be alert to domestic interest groups arrayed in the the educational, scientific, cultural and media establishments. Our position, which they should understand, is simple. The costs are too high, and the benefits are too few. This is a foreign policy decision, made for reasons of foreign policy: It is no longer worthwhile for the U.S. to remain as a member of an international organization that acts as UNESCO acts, and in which negative foreign policy considerations so much outweigh technical benefits received. We should emphasize, however, that an intervening year remains, during which we will work with all interested groups to organize an effective kind of international cooperation respecting education, science, culture, and communication. Our willingness to engage in existing alternative forms of cooperation on an international basis should plainly appear as a prominent feature of our decision to withdraw from UNESCO.

(5) Congress. We will consult in detail with interested members of both Houses of Congress. (See Tab D.)

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CONCLUSION

It is my best judgment that we must take this decisive action now. The notice of withdrawal we propose could not take effect, however, until December 31, 1984. An opportunity for possibly salutary developments remains open. If, during 1984, there should be significant evidence of a substantial and lasting change in the way UNESCO approaches its tasks, this action could conceivably be rescinded. Under existing circumstances, however, our resolve to withdraw should remain firm.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you agree to a U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO effective December 31, 1984, with notice to be given immediately; and

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. That you sign the letter of notification to UNESCO Director General M'Bow at Tab A.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab A - Letter to UNESCO Director General M'Bow

Tab B - Memorandum from the Legal Adviser

Tab C - Memorandum: "Balance Sheet" of Benefits from UNESCO Membership

Tab D - Memorandum: A Proposed Strategy for Disengagement from UNESCO

Drafted: IO: RWAherne/GWClark      Cleared: USUN:Kirkpatrick *JK*  
 12/15/83      x22650      x24459      L/UNA:TBorek

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# **What Are the Issues Concerning the Decision of the United States To Withdraw from UNESCO?**

**An Advisory from the United States National  
Commission for UNESCO**

**A project authorized by the Executive Committee  
and prepared by the Vice-Chairpersons and other members  
of the United States National Commission for UNESCO**

**Nancy Risser, Leonard R. Sussman, and David Wiley, Vice-Chairpersons**

**Published and disseminated with private funds**

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**UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR UNESCO**

**Additional copies of this publication are available on written request from the Vice-chairpersons:**

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## SUMMARY OF ISSUES AND TABLE OF CONTENTS

### INTRODUCTION

Page 1

- 1. The U.S. National Commission for UNESCO opposes U.S. withdrawal but wants to institute improvements in the Organization.** Based upon extensive review and assessment of UNESCO, the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO voted overwhelmingly on December 16, 1983, in support of a resolution calling for the United States to remain in UNESCO as a "matter of national interest," to defend U.S. interests there, and to seek needed changes in the organization.

Page 3
- 2. The Administration has a number of reasons for the proposed withdrawal.** Several reasons have been given for the Administration's decision to withdraw from UNESCO, primarily: (1) politicization of issues; (2) statist concepts, particularly in communications and education; and (3) budget and management issues.

Page 4
- 3. Timing of the U.S. decision to withdraw did not allow full assessment.** No public indication of the serious possibility of withdrawal from UNESCO was given by the Administration prior to its announcement in December 1983. After the July announcement of the policy review, the Director of UNESCO Affairs at the State Department informed the U.S. National Commission that the purpose of the review was to secure improvements in UNESCO's behavior, not to pave the way for withdrawal. In fact the United States served notice of its intention to withdraw after UNESCO had adopted the basic elements of the six-year program with the United States joining in a consensus in its favor.

Page 4
- 4. Other Federal agencies, embassies, and consulates do not support the U.S. decision to withdraw.** The 83 U.S. embassies and consulates around the world and 13 federal agencies responding to the Administration's review of policy regarding UNESCO did not recommend withdrawal. The summary of the review released by the State Department on February 27, 1984, does not include any specific references to these responses.

Page 6
- 5. Allies and other nations do not support withdrawal.** While they recognize the right of the United States to withdraw and acknowledge the serious problems within UNESCO, representatives of other Western and Third World delegations consider the loss of U.S. intellectual and political leadership a major blow. No other nations, including Britain, have followed the U.S., choosing instead to work for reform from within.

Page 7
- 6. The decision can be altered.** The decision to withdraw can be modified—revoked or extended—at any time up to December 31, 1984. Assistant Secretary Newell has indicated the feeling that "there is no conceivable way" that UNESCO can make the changes necessary to have the U.S. remain. A Monitoring Panel has been appointed to advise the Secretary of State on changes occurring in UNESCO over the remainder of 1984.

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7. **U.S. evaluations of the 1983 Biennial UNESCO General Conference were generally positive.** Evaluations in November 1983 by the Ambassador to UNESCO and the Head of the U.S. Delegation, both appointed by the Administration, were clearly positive. Ambassador to UNESCO Gerard noted that "we can take pride in the work and in many of the accomplishments of the General Conference." Ambassador Hennelly, Head of the Delegation, noted that the General Conference was among "the least politicized and most constructive from the U.S. point of view in recent memory."

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8. **UNESCO has been no more politicized than other international organizations.** Like other UN organizations, UNESCO's General Conference and Executive Board meetings provide a forum for political rhetoric, some of which is hostile to the U.S. and to Western positions. The 161 representatives of national governments in UNESCO, including the U.S., inevitably bring their political concerns to UNESCO; however, little of the substantive educational, scientific, and cultural program is politicized. Only approximately one percent of the annual budget is spent on programs which the U.S. State Department believes are "highly politicized," namely, disarmament studies, the rights of peoples, and refugee education.

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9. **The "rights of peoples" need not detract from individual freedoms.** This term, which originated in the Organization of African Unity, is still evolving as a concept and need not necessarily diminish individual human rights. The way in which it is ultimately defined will very much depend on the strategies of the U.S. and like-minded governments as the discussion proceeds within UNESCO. Withdrawal will end U.S. participation in the debate.

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10. **UNESCO itself does not advocate a "statist" approach to issues.** Although some member nations have a "statist" philosophy that national governments should direct, control, and determine the educational and cultural development of their people, UNESCO does not itself advocate a statist approach. UNESCO programs and materials are available to member countries regardless of the political system used by the nation.

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11. **The USSR does not exercise inordinate control of UNESCO programs.** The Soviets play the same aggressive role in UNESCO that they play in other UN bodies, but they cannot and do not control or exert a major influence on the program. The USSR does take an active interest in UNESCO and devotes significant resources to it, unlike the relative apathy shown by recent U.S. administrations. Only eight percent of the UNESCO staff originates from Eastern bloc "communist" countries.

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12. **Disarmament studies in UNESCO constitute a small proportion of programs.** Support of disarmament studies, cited as politicization of UNESCO educational programs, constitutes less than one percent of the total education budget and about one-third of one percent of the total budget. More active U.S. participation would help assure that disarmament studies reflect Western views.

13. **Israel is not being attacked in UNESCO.** Israeli policies have been attacked in many meetings in the UN system. Continued U.S. participation in UNESCO can protect Israeli interests. At the General Conference in November 1983, Israeli credentials were not challenged and anti-Israeli rhetoric was muted or nonexistent, according to Ambassador Hennelly. Page 15
14. **Services to the PLO and African liberation movements are small in scale and largely educational.** UNESCO does not provide support for terrorism. Like other UN bodies, it does accord non-voting observer representation to organizations such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, African National Congress, Pan Africanist Congress, and South West African Peoples Organization. UNESCO provides primarily educational materials and teacher training for schools serving the children of these groups. Funding for such programs is annually deducted from the U.S. payment. Page 16
15. **UNESCO has taken no actions to end freedom of the press.** UNESCO has taken no actions to control journalists or limit press freedom; however, justifiable concern has been aroused by proposals by the Soviets and others to misuse The New World Information and Communications Order (NWICO). Negotiations on communications issues at the 1983 General Conference generally favored the Western free press position. Page 16
16. **The New International Economic Order (NIEO) has not been central to UNESCO programs.** The UN-originated NIEO is reflected in many of the debates, publications, and program activities of UNESCO. The NIEO proposals, which are of some concern for the industrialized countries even though they have no legal force, do reflect the aspirations and needs of many developing countries and cannot be ignored. Page 18
17. **No actions have been taken by UNESCO against U.S. corporations.** UNESCO has never passed proposals for a Transnational Corporate Responsibility Code to control American corporations operating abroad. Strong U.S. efforts have curtailed any such codes and have advocated the interests of American corporations. Continued U.S. participation in UNESCO can forestall the elaboration of codes harmful to U.S. interests. Page 18
18. **The United States is not underrepresented in the UNESCO professional staff.** The United States has the largest number of professional posts in the UNESCO Secretariat of any nation (82 of 814 at the end of 1983). The recent slight decline in number of U.S. nationals could be remedied by appointment of four or five more Americans, placing U.S. representation within the "desirable range." More staff work by the State Department and close monitoring by the U.S. Mission would ensure a balanced distribution of Americans by sector and grade of post, as well as by stage of career. Page 19
19. **The UNESCO budget had a small increase this year and the U.S. contribution is only \$25.8 million.** Assistant Secretary Newell has confirmed that the actual U.S. assessment for the current fiscal year will be \$25.8 million, significantly less than in recent years. Though described in the U.S. as growing by "profligate leaps," increases in Page 19

the UNESCO budget have generally not deviated from those of other UN agencies, and the increases are reported to have been smaller than those of the International Labor Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Health Organization.

20. **The UNESCO salary structure is high, like that of all international agencies and foreign missions.** Although there are aspects of the UNESCO salary structure to which the U.S. rightly objects, these objections apply throughout the UN system; they are not unique to UNESCO. Its professional salaries are based on those prevailing in the best civil service, that of the United States itself. The total salaries of the UNESCO staff constitute less than one-half of the UNESCO budget, a proportion which has been declining since the early 1970s. Page 20

21. **The proportion of staff in the Paris headquarters reflects the types of tasks performed by the Organization.** The U.S. has always taken the position that, while UN agencies must have field offices to handle their activities in member countries, most funding for technical assistance programs such as UNESCO should come from voluntary contributions and not from the assessed budgets. The UNESCO pattern is consistent with this position. Page 20

22. **According to a 1979 study, the proportion of UNESCO budget allocated to administration is not inordinately high.** UNESCO's mandate is to develop international cooperation within its fields of competence. This requires a large headquarters staff to interpret and translate into six official languages, print its many publications, and service its General Conference and other meetings. A 1979 study of UNESCO plans and budgets by the U.S. General Accounting Office "regarded the management procedures to be unique and forward-looking compared to other UN agencies examined; and further, as having the potential for improving the effectiveness of U.S. participation in UNESCO ....We believe they are conceptually sound and permit progress toward improved disclosure of program aims and their financial implications for member governments." Page 21

23. **The U.S. has been successful in participating in UNESCO and accomplishing its goals there when it has exerted strong leadership.** The U.S. delegation to the 22nd General Conference in 1983 achieved a number of successes, but generally there has been a decline in the quality of U.S. participation in UNESCO during the past decade or more. More than one delegation has been sent which included no recognized representatives of U.S. scientific, cultural, and educational communities. Delegations have included too many persons being rewarded for domestic political purposes. They lacked experience in international conference procedures and, in that sense, were no match for the professional conference experts fielded by many other delegations. Page 22

- APPENDIX I ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR UNESCO AS OF DECEMBER 1983** Page 25

- APPENDIX II STATEMENTS REGARDING UNESCO BY U.S. SCIENCE, EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL, AND MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS** Page 27

## INTRODUCTION

On December 28, 1983, U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz notified the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) of the intention of the United States to withdraw from UNESCO effective December 31, 1984. Prior to this decision, the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO had conducted several assessments of UNESCO, especially that reported in *A Critical Assessment of U.S. Participation in UNESCO*, published in 1982, and in a survey of nongovernmental organizations of the United States in the education, science, and cultural/arts sectors in 1983. On December 16, 1983, the National Commission voted overwhelmingly in support of a resolution calling for efforts to reform UNESCO, but equally calling for the United States to remain in UNESCO as a matter of "national interest."

The U.S. National Commission (USNC)—established by Congress (Public Law 565, 1946) in fulfillment of Article VII of the UNESCO Constitution—provides liaison between UNESCO and its programs with the major U.S. organizations "interested in educational, scientific, and cultural matters." Two-thirds of the USNC membership has been designated by nongovernmental organizations and one-third nominated by the U.S. Administration from federal, state, and local governments and members at large. (See Appendix I for a list of organizational members.)

The role of the USNC is to:

- a) disseminate information concerning UNESCO to the private sector,
- b) prepare position papers for the Department of State, the U.S. Mission to UNESCO, and the U.S. delegations to UNESCO meetings,
- c) initiate conferences and seminars on UNESCO themes,
- d) ensure U.S. representation in the wide variety of UNESCO activities and conferences,
- e) consult with the U.S. State Department concerning U.S. participation in UNESCO, and
- f) occasionally conduct joint projects with other national commissions.

The USNC met December 16, 1983, at the time the State Department had announced it was considering withdrawing from UNESCO. The USNC then reviewed its own previous assessments and those of the U.S. Mission to UNESCO, the State Department, and members of the U.S. Delegation to the Biennial UNESCO General Conference (November 1983). On the basis of this information the USNC then passed a resolution urging continued U.S. membership in UNESCO in order to defend U.S. interests there, to seek needed changes in the organization, and to achieve the original objectives that motivated the United States to assist in founding UNESCO.

The need for dispassionate, reliable, and objective information on UNESCO has never been greater. For nearly ten years, the U.S. press reported almost exclusively the controversial debates at UNESCO concerning the performance of the news media. The National News Council, an independent press-monitoring group sponsored by some U.S. media, examined 448 news reports and 206 editorials concerning the 1980 General Conference of UNESCO. Said the Council:

Not one story emanating from the six-week conference dealt with any of the reports, speeches or resolutions on UNESCO's basic activities in combatting illiteracy, developing alternative energy sources, protecting historic monuments, broadening educational programs for scientists and engineers, sponsoring basic research in food production and oceanic sciences, and scores of other fields.

Debate over communications issues was the "central topic" for news reports and editorials, the Council said, and most of them were "hostile."

At the 1983 General Conference, one major newspaper devoted the top of a page to the report that a press-control resolution had been introduced. When the resolution was withdrawn, no story appeared, and only a short article reported the generally Western-oriented conclusion of the two-week debate.

Discussion is now underway on reform in UNESCO. Specific proposals are on the agenda of the Organization's Executive Board. It is not the purpose of this publication to discuss specific proposals for reform. The objective is rather to examine the main arguments and allegations which have been made against UNESCO and to help bring about a better understanding in this country of the problems affecting UNESCO. In particular, it is important to promote understanding of what can in fact be improved in the Organization and also to separate fact from exaggeration or myth in some of the charges which have been leveled.

To enable all constituents of the USNC to share with their memberships reliable information on this important issue, the officers offer this summary and comment on the implications of the United States' announced withdrawal from UNESCO.

Nancy Risser  
Leonard R. Sussman  
David Wiley  
Vice-Chairpersons  
U.S. National Commission for UNESCO

June 15, 1984

**1. The U.S. National Commission for UNESCO opposes U.S. withdrawal but wants to institute improvements in the Organization.**

The National Commission agrees with the Administration that UNESCO requires reform, but considers that this should be achieved by seeking change from within, together with other like-minded countries.

The Commission has conducted several important reviews of relations with UNESCO in the past two years. A Conference was devoted to a "Critical Assessment of Relations with UNESCO" in the summer of 1982. Five working groups unanimously concluded that the U.S. should stay in UNESCO and increase our participation with a view to exerting stronger leadership. The lack of high level policy attention towards UNESCO and general American neglect of the Organization were regarded as having contributed to its decline.

At the request of the State Department, another review was conducted in 1983. All 97 Commissioners were contacted, together with some forty non-governmental organizations most closely concerned with UNESCO's work. Twenty substantive replies were received. Nearly all were critical of some aspects of UNESCO's performance; however, without exception all concluded that the U.S. should stay in UNESCO.

The issue was also thoroughly debated at the Commission's annual meeting on December 16, 1983, where a resolution criticizing UNESCO's failings, but calling "in the national interest" for continued U.S. membership was adopted overwhelmingly.

(A summary of comment from the U.S. scientific, educational, arts, cultural, and media communities is provided in Appendix II of this document.)

The Commission has been misrepresented in some quarters as an apologist for UNESCO, "glowingly supportive" of the Organization. This arises from a misconception both of the Commission's role and

what it has been saying. The main function of the Commission is to be a channel of communication between this country and UNESCO and between the government and those non-governmental organizations most concerned with UNESCO's work. UNESCO commissions in most countries have important advisory, communicative, and management functions. The U.S. Government, by contrast, has largely ignored the U.S. National Commission, and in fact the Department of State made an unsuccessful attempt early in 1983 to eliminate its funding. Although Congress restored part of the funding, the Commission's professional staff has been effectively eliminated.

Many members of the Commission are truly dismayed at UNESCO's declining effectiveness and have experienced its failings more directly than most. Many members are also more aware than most of the continuing value of much of UNESCO's work and, more significantly, of the considerable scope for achieving improvement in UNESCO's direction and performance. While a small minority in the Commission believe that constructive reform will be achieved by the U.S. turning its back on UNESCO, a majority believe rather that dedication and commitment are required on the part of those who believe in the legitimate goals of UNESCO and who are in a position to improve the direction and management of the Organization. The Commission has been saying, in essence, that the decline of UNESCO is attributable in part to its neglect by this country, and that if any serious attention had been paid to the Commission's advice and practical recommendations over the past two to three years, genuine reform could have been achieved. In that case there would be no occasion to consider withdrawing.

## 2. The Administration has a number of reasons for the proposed withdrawal.

Differing reasons have been given in the public statements and letters of Assistant Secretary of State Gregory Newell, Secretary of State George Shultz, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane, and in the State Department's U.S./UNESCO policy review. These have been summarized in a 1984 staff study of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee:

The McFarlane memo of December 23 refers to U.S. inability to reform UNESCO in a substantive way over the past 3 years, its continued politicization of almost every issue, its attack upon a free flow of communications and an unrestrained budgetary expansion.

The Shultz letter refers to trends in the management, policy, and budget of UNESCO that detract from the organization's effectiveness and failed U.S. efforts to encourage the organization to reverse these trends and redirect itself to its founding purposes.

Mr. Newell says the U.S. decision came at the conclusion of a long effort to reason with UNESCO, and a careful reassessment of U.S. relations with UNESCO. The administration finally determined that as currently directed, organized, and focused, UNESCO does not serve U.S. interests. Mr. Newell also says UNESCO policies serve anti-U.S. political ends and in particular that UNESCO policies are misguided, its programs tendentious and its budget both extravagant and mismanaged.

The U.S./UNESCO policy review states three major reasons for the decision:

(1) Politicization of almost every issue (disarmament, human rights, etc.); (2) statist concepts (new world information order); and (3) budget and management issues.

Assistant Secretary of State Gregory Newell has stated that the Reagan Administration has frequently advised UNESCO of the limits of U.S. toleration and that for three years the Administration has applied to UNESCO the same goals and priorities that guide our relations with all multilateral institutions. "UNESCO alone has not responded." The U.S. decided to leave "after a long effort to reason with UNESCO, and a careful reassessment of our relationship." The U.S. is no longer willing to pay "tribute money," and believes that the goals of genuine international development in the fields of education, science, culture, and communications can be more effectively pursued outside UNESCO. The Administration has stated that the U.S. remains committed to membership in the UN system and that withdrawal from UNESCO will have a salutary effect on our relations with other UN agencies.

It should be noted, however, that the only significant difference between UNESCO's response and that of other UN bodies was in regard to its budget. UNESCO persisted in seeking a substantial increase in its annual budget, while the UN and other agencies asked for little or no increase. Even so, the UNESCO budget was cut substantially below the amount requested by its Director General, largely because of pressure from the U.S. and other major contributors.

The record shows that, apart from the budget issue, most of the political problems identified by the United States in UNESCO in fact originate in the United Nations. While it may be useful to warn the UN system of U.S. concerns, our withdrawal from UNESCO will leave that forum open to easier manipulation by those who do not share our views.

## 3. Timing of the U.S. decision to withdraw did not allow full assessment.

Following the announcement by the State Department of a review of relations with UNESCO in June 1983, the possibility of U.S. withdrawal was on the minds of many delegates to the November 1983

General Conference, although no specific indication of a planned withdrawal was given by the Administration until December 1983.

Although general dissatisfaction with UNESCO has



been expressed by some U.S. public and private sector representatives for several years, especially on the grounds of politicization and alleged attempts to interfere with the free flow of information, no specific complaints or threats to withdraw were evident. The U.S. joined the consensus which approved the Second Medium Term Plan of UNESCO in 1982 and the 1984-85 Program in November 1983. Like other countries, the U.S. registered objections to specific aspects of the Plan and the Program in the course of the debates leading to their adoption. Some of the U.S. concerns were met. Others were not.

The comprehensive *Report to Congress* by the State Department in February 1983, concluded that:

U.S. interests are generally well served by UNESCO programs, which are, for the most part, non-political and which can most effectively be pursued through international cooperation.

The same Administration report also said:

UNESCO is a major forum for U.S. multilateral diplomacy. As such, it provides the U.S. with an opportunity to promote U.S. (and Western) values and methods—particularly in the Third World.

In November 1983, U.S. Ambassador to UNESCO Jean Gerard gave a favorable view of the General Conference. Just a month before the decision to withdraw was announced, she concluded:

We can take pride in the work and in many of the accomplishments of this General Conference. It has been marked, in many instances, by agreement on issues about which such agreement has not always been easy. Most importantly, I believe—I hope—that we have laid the groundwork here for greater efficiency and effectiveness in UNESCO's programs.

Moreover, the statements made by Ambassador Gerard last November are consistent with the position she had taken in the previous year. Addressing the U. S. National Commission in 1982, Ambassador Gerard had said:

My report from Paris is, in a word, positive...I would like to quote one phrase from Luther Evans that conveys a lot of what I myself feel about (UNESCO)—“UNESCO is more than an institution, it is a work of art still being thought out and worked on, therefore, fascinating by reason of its very incompleteness and its unresolved ‘enigmas.’ ”

On September 23, 1982, Ambassador Gerard had delivered a comprehensive statement to the Executive Board on the UNESCO Draft Medium Term Plan. She gave no hint of a possible withdrawal.

These positions are consonant with statements made by Assistant Secretary Newell more than nine months before the decision to withdraw was made. Addressing the February 3, 1983, meeting of the National Commission, Assistant Secretary Newell, referring to the Special Meeting of the U.S. National Commission in June 1982, said:

The basic thrust of that special meeting was the unanimous recommendation that the United States should continue to remain a member of UNESCO, but that the effectiveness of U.S. participation in the work of the organization be increased.

He then added, “I fully supported your review then and support the conclusions of that meeting now.”

In this and other statements U.S. officials expressed criticism of UNESCO, but the tone was generally mild. At no time until December 1983 was any public indication given that the possibility of withdrawal was seriously under consideration. In fact, after the policy review had been announced, the Director of UNESCO Affairs at the State Department in July 1983 informed the U.S. National Commission that the purpose of the review was to secure positive improvements in UNESCO's behavior, not to pave the way for withdrawal. UNESCO officials expressed surprise at the announcement of U.S. withdrawal for the same reason—namely that the U.S. had at most given mixed signals about its attitude, but at no stage any indication of serious intention to withdraw.

A credible threat to withdraw, issued with adequate public notice for the 161-nation organiza-

tion to consider concrete reforms, might have resulted in constructive change. For example, a British government document with specific suggestions for reform was placed on the Agenda of the UNESCO 119th Executive Board Session in May 1984, and another unofficial proposal by a group under the chairmanship of the Netherlands Permanent Representative to UNESCO also suggests specific reforms. But until December 1983 U.S. statements suggested that withdrawal was not planned at this stage. Evidence has yet to be made public to support the contention made by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Newell that the United States served notice of

its intentions three years ago and that the absence of any UNESCO response led to the decision to withdraw.

In fact, the United States served notice of its intention to withdraw *after* UNESCO had adopted the basic elements of a six-year program (with the United States joining in a consensus in its favor) and after it had voted funds for the implementation of that program during the next two years. It is difficult to see what major changes the United States could hope to achieve in this program in the immediate future if the U.S. is not actively involved as a member in pressing for such changes.

#### 4. Other Federal agencies, embassies, and consulates do not support the U.S. decision to withdraw.

In 1983 the State Department consulted thirteen separate departments and agencies of the Federal Government and a large number of U.S. embassies and consulates abroad, in addition to the National Commission, in the course of the Administration's review. The review was released by the State Department on February 27.

After a highly critical review of UNESCO, sector by sector, the State Department concluded:

UNESCO programs benefit selected groups and sectors in American society, especially certain groups of scholars, scientists, and cultural specialists. Most UNESCO programs are aimed almost exclusively at the Third World and have little or no direct impact on U.S. interests, but many of them complement general historic U.S. foreign assistance objectives. Many UNESCO field programs in education, science, and culture are of this nature. It must be concluded, however, that UNESCO's severe management problems diminish the constructive results that these programs could make if the Organization were effectively managed.

A number of other programs, particularly in communications, human rights, education for "peace and understanding," and "peace and disarmament," clearly work against U.S. interests. Still another group of programs involve support for theoretical studies and for unnecessary, costly, and duplicative activities that divert resources from real

and pressing needs. These programs are supported by what has come to be an automatic majority in UNESCO—a majority that is opposed to Western ideas on personal freedom, human rights, free-market economics, and the role of the state in its citizens' affairs; and negative toward the need for budget restraint. Given UNESCO's grave institutional malfunctions and its other problems in both the program and managerial areas, it would require major, significant, structural reform to bring UNESCO into line with U.S. interests.

It is not clear on what evidence these conclusions were based, because the agency and departmental submissions, subsequently released to Congress in mid-1984, apparently indicate opposite conclusions. In May 1984, a State Department official indicated that not one of the 83 U.S. embassies and consulates responding recommended withdrawal.

For example, the National Science Foundation, which coordinated the responses of seven scientific and technical agencies, concluded:

The weight of tangible benefits over certain impediments clearly justifies continued U.S. participation in UNESCO. Many of the science projects sponsored by UNESCO bring contributions and unique benefits to the U.S. scientific research effort and also promote selected U.S. foreign policy goals including development assistance.

UNESCO provides a unique forum for international cooperative scientific research and data exchanges and gives access to important scientific research, data, expertise and resources.... despite UNESCO's obvious management shortcomings, it plays an important role in providing a broad range of scientific services and information to developing and industrialized nations. There is no other obvious organization which could assume this role.

The U.S. Department of Education concluded that in the event of withdrawal:

...the U.S. would lose the influence it now undoubtedly has on the UNESCO education program, the drawbacks notwithstanding. In spite of the problems, the U.S. exerts as much or more influence in education than any other nation, certainly more than the Soviet Union. We would lose important ground in the significant areas of intergovernmental meetings, normative instruments, UNESCO administration and American staff in headquarters and field positions. The U.S. would abandon the field to the Soviet Union and radical Third World countries.... During negotiations on what the U.S. considers fundamental, uncompromisable issues in education, the U.S. usually prevails.

(Regarding possible alternatives) [t]he U.S. does have educational interaction in some important international bodies, notably the OECD and the OAS.... (These) and any other regional fora are

necessarily limited in the nations involved and would not compensate for the voids in education that would occur by withdrawing from UNESCO. Likewise, AID could in no way make up for UNESCO educational development.... Neither the present combined effort of higher education, nor any conceivable increased activity could compensate for diminished U.S. involvement in legitimate world educational issues. UNESCO is increasingly at the center of world educational concerns.

The Smithsonian Institution concluded:

It is essential that U.S. access to UNESCO be maintained and that UNESCO's essential programs not be crippled for want of U.S. financial support and leadership. It must be realized that UNESCO is a democratic international forum, however imperfect, for which there exist no alternatives in its subject fields. It replaces informal structures destroyed forever by the modern world. Because of this, UNESCO serves very real U.S. interests of which preservation of cultural property is but one important example, and one for which the Smithsonian is particularly suited to attest.

Without U.S. support, UNESCO will surely continue to exist and to play its vital role, albeit without the most important constituent voice for democratic processes. If the U.S. should remain outside UNESCO, it could be vulnerable to the charge that it was neglecting broad considerations of international responsibility.

ILLEGIB

##### 5. Allies and other nations do not support withdrawal.

In a report, "U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO," a February 1984 staff study of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, the foreign reaction is summarized as follows:

Except for certain radical states hostile to the United States; namely, Iran and Libya, who reputedly applauded the U.S. decision, the announcement of the U.S. decision met with varying degrees of official regret by several foreign delegations to UNESCO....

Representatives of other Western and Third World nations to UNESCO recognize the right of the United States to withdraw from UNESCO, acknowledge the serious problems plaguing that institution and consider the U.S. decision a major blow to UNESCO. In the latter regard, various representatives consider the loss of U.N. intellectual and political leadership a greater potential problem than the loss of the U.S. financial contribution.

Several themes characterize the reaction of representatives of a Latin American member and African member of UNESCO and close observers of the Third World. First, genuine surprise was expressed at the U.S. decision because it was believed the 1983 UNESCO General Conference had substantially accommodated U.S. concerns about the biennial budget and politicization. It was pointed out that the general conference reduced the 1984-85 UNESCO program budget by \$10 million following adoption of the Nordic compromise and that a drafting and negotiating group under the Third World leadership succeeded in persuading governments to withdraw 10 contentious resolutions and substantially amend some 20 other resolutions which were then adopted by consensus. It was also believed that statements given by the U.S. head of delegation and the U.S. Ambassador to UNESCO at the conclusion of the 1983 General Conference signaled satisfaction with the gains achieved and praise for the conference results.

Second, there were references to the principle of universality and the importance of continued participation by member states in international institutions such as UNESCO. One Representative said the U.S. decision not only undermined that principle but showed inconsistency of behavior since the United States had always urged adherence to the principle of universality on behalf of other countries.

Third, the importance of U.S. intellectual contributions to UNESCO was underscored and it was made clear that the threat of losing U.S. support for 25 percent of UNESCO's budget was of secondary importance to the loss of U.S. intellectual leadership in the organization.

Fourth, there is strong fear that a political imbalance will occur in UNESCO if the United States—one of the two global superpowers—withdraws. Without the United States, who will stand up to the Soviets? Smaller developing countries can scarcely be expected to stand up alone to and resist Soviet efforts in areas such as peace and disarmament. In this respect, it was

pointed out that the Third World is less interested in disarmament studies, than in education.

A number of countries have expressed "understanding of the reasons" which led to the U.S. decision. Assistant Secretary Newell has cited this in support of the U.S. decision. In fact, no country has supported the U.S. action. The "understanding" in some cases reflects agreement with some of the criticisms the United States has expressed and, in other cases, the diplomatic equivalent of "no comment." Those countries which share U.S. criticisms have all expressed the desire to work for reform from within. This includes Britain, which has indicated concrete reforms it deems necessary to secure continued British support for membership in UNESCO. No other country so far has voiced any plans for withdrawal.

Privately, some representatives of UNESCO national commissions from U.S. NATO allies have indicated their great dismay at the U.S. decision, believing it flies in the face of significant change begun at UNESCO by a number of nations, weakens the forces for continuing change, and endangers recent rapprochments between the West and the Third World.

Specific comments by other countries include:

Great Britain:

We eventually decided that the right course for the United Kingdom, at least for the time being, was to stay in UNESCO and fight for reform within.

Baroness Young, Minister of State

A few members argued for United Kingdom withdrawal, but the clear majority of those that spoke were in favor of our staying in on the grounds that to leave would be to turn our back on an important channel of communication and cooperation with the developing countries.

Mr. Timothy Raison, Minister  
for Overseas Development,  
reporting on meeting held  
with United Kingdom National  
Commission for UNESCO,  
December 1983

**France:**

The spokesman for the Ministry of External Relations was reported on December 29 to have said that France was disappointed with the U.S. decision and hopes that the period of notice may be used profitably to enable a decision to be reached that is consistent with the principle of universality. He added (that) UNESCO's spheres of activities are so important that it is preferable for the values affirmed by the Western countries and in particular, the United States, to remain present.

**Canada:**

Although we understand U.S. concerns we regret their decision and we have no intention of following suit. We shall continue to work within the organization to bring about the changes we seek.

Canadian Government Spokesman

**Israel:**

The Manchester Guardian has reported a cable from the U.S. mission to UNESCO to the State Department in which, according to this publicly reported cable, the Israel Government argued vehemently to the U.S. Government against U.S. withdrawal. Israel representatives pointed out that they will be put in the peculiar position of perhaps having to follow suit and that this will lead to delegitimization of the State of Israel in other international fora. So exactly what the Israel Government wants in international organization this U.S. policy works against.

Congressman Jim Leach (R-Iowa)  
in the House of Representatives  
May 9, 1984

**Australia:**

The Commission regrets that at this critical time in the search for world peace the United States should announce its intention to withdraw from UNESCO.

UNESCO provides the only continuing international forum for the discussion of many world issues.

For the United States to maintain a position of intellectual isolation would be a world tragedy.

Australian National  
Commission for UNESCO

**Finland:**

...UNESCO is the only world wide co-operation forum for experts in different fields of science and culture....We all need UNESCO and I hope, therefore, that the activities of UNESCO, could as soon as possible, again rest on a universal basis.

STAT

Mr. Gustav Bjorkstrand  
Minister of Science and Culture

**The Netherlands:**

The Netherlands Government...regrets the withdrawal of the United States. The last (22nd) General Conference of UNESCO...has proceeded, in the opinion of the government, in a reasonably positive and calm atmosphere. Notably, no serious clashes concerning the media and human rights issues did occur during that conference. Furthermore, as withdrawal could have negative effects on the future course of UNESCO and the functioning of the U.N. system in general, the Netherlands have urged the U.S. Government not to withdraw.

Statement by the Netherlands Government

**Malaysia:**

Over such issues as UNESCO, the United States has been at odds with the Third World....this is unfortunate because to my mind the United States has always had a historic role and the capacity to truly champion the interests of the Third World.

Dr. Mahathir Mohamed  
Prime Minister of Malaysia

**Organization of African Unity:**

...It should be stressed that the great merit of UNESCO stems from the fact that during its 38 years of existence, it succeeded in promoting cultural dialogue, initiated discussions on scientific developments which have enabled our societies to train men and adapt themselves particularly to the revolution of the computer age.

It is patent that in all these various fields, the contribution of the United States of America has been very significant. Its withdrawal from the UNESCO would, in the medium term, deprive the Second Plan and the activities of the Organiza-

tion, of an essential element of dialogue and stimulation.

Dr. Peter U. Onu  
Secretary General a.i.

**6. The decision can be altered.**

The decision to withdraw can be revoked or canceled at any time up to December 31, 1984. During that period, the U.S. can also announce that it is extending the minimum period of notice to a date later than December 31, 1984, for example until the end of 1985. That would allow the regular meeting of the 23rd General Conference of UNESCO to consider any recommendations from the Executive Board or relevant resolutions from Member States. That Conference, moreover, will be voting on the next Program and Budget (for 1986-1987).

The Administration has appointed a panel of experts from the academic, media, and corporate communities to advise the Secretary of State on changes occurring in UNESCO over the remainder of 1984. This Monitoring Panel was the result of wishes expressed by President Reagan in a December 23, 1983, memo to Secretary of State Shultz from National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane. McFarlane wrote:

The President wishes us to continue to expend every effort to effect meaningful changes over the next year to eliminate the suppression of minority views and political diversions and restore fiscal integrity. In pursuing the effort he wishes you to consider significant upgrading of our

representation in UNESCO and appointment of a panel consisting of senior representatives of the academic community, the media and the corporate world to advise us over the next year. He is prepared to review the decision to withdraw should concrete changes materialize.

On the other hand, Assistant Secretary of State Gregory Newell at a December 29, 1983, briefing noted:

...our feeling is that there is no conceivable way that UNESCO could change its policies, its direction, its practices, such that we would be enticed to remain as part of the organization. Having said that, and stating that the elements of UNESCO are important to the United States in the development area, should there be significant progress moving away from politicization, number one, statist approaches, number two, and reordering its house managerially and fiscally, then we would be open perhaps at the end of the year to look again to make sure that the decision which the President has made remains. But for the time being, it is our conclusion that those changes are just not in the offing.

**7. U.S. evaluations of the 1983 Biennial UNESCO General Conference were generally positive.**

In spite of her subsequent active advocacy for withdrawal, U.S. Ambassador to UNESCO Jean Gerard said, in a speech at the end of the General Conference:

We can take pride in the work and in many of the accomplishments of this General Conference. It

has been marked, in many instances, by agreement on issues about which such agreement has not always been easy. More importantly, I believe... that we have laid the groundwork here for greater efficiency and effectiveness in UNESCO programmes.

Head of the U.S. Delegation, Ambassador Edmund P. Hennelly, who is an executive officer of Mobil Oil, has indicated he went to the General Conference expecting to support withdrawal. However, after the conference, he remarked that:

...22nd General Conference was among the least politicized and the most constructive from the U.S. point of view in recent memory...the personal balance sheet that I have tallied up shows

that the conference was a clear plus for the U.S.

A long-time critic of UNESCO, Leonard Sussman, Executive Director of Freedom House and member of the U.S. delegation, said:

I feel the conference generally showed that it can be responsive to Western positions. If we sever our ties, we would have still less chance of influencing policy consistent with our objectives.

#### 8. UNESCO has been no more politicized than other international organizations.

U. S. interests are generally well served by UNESCO programs which are, for the most part, non-political and which can most effectively be pursued through international cooperation. This is particularly the case in the sciences, where the U.S. is active in inter-governmental bodies dealing with oceanography, ecology, hydrology and geology.

Report of the U.S. State Department  
to the Congress, January 24, 1983

Because it is constituted by representatives of 161 governments, the UNESCO General Conference inevitably is a forum for the expression of points of view of representatives of governments; therefore, the political situation of the world is inevitably reflected at the General Conference. That is less true in the programs and projects of UNESCO dealing with substantive issues of education, science, and culture.

The UNESCO program and the allocation of resources to it are proposed by the Director General. Then they are reviewed and endorsed first by the Executive Board and then by all members of the General Conference with such changes as the Conference decides to make. The great bulk of that program and the studies, publications, and other activities which it calls for have been endorsed by a consensus procedure in recent years without a negative vote being cast by any member, including the United States (except on a limited number of projects during discussions in the Conference's commissions).

The issue of politicization usually arises in connection with some of the general policy resolutions or

the programs and resource allocations on which there is not a consensus at the General Conference and a vote must be taken. Like all broadly representative deliberative bodies—the U.S. Congress not excepted—UNESCO conferences cannot avoid political issues even when dealing with technical matters.

Actually, the United States government has directed its main objection to the insertion of *extraneous* political issues that are raised by individual member states, thus recognizing that some politicization is inevitable because of the heterogeneous values and politics of the family of nations. What is objectionable is the raising of political issues which do not further UNESCO's purpose, which would inject a tendentious bias in its program, or which make it difficult to assure full and fair consideration of legitimate issues.

An example of such an issue was the attempt led by some Arab delegates a few years ago to deny Israel's participation in certain UNESCO program activities on the basis of disputable allegations concerning Israel's behavior in the occupied territories. Moreover, denying Israel's right to participate would have violated the principle of universality in United Nations bodies. But that attempt was eventually defeated, due largely to the strong objections of the United States, and it has not been repeated since.

However, an Administration official has also accused UNESCO of "politicizing the South Africa question." Since UNESCO is involved in promoting respect for human rights, can the U.S. really object when UNESCO sponsors studies critical of that government's universally condemned apartheid

policies? Would the U.S. object if the General Conference could be persuaded to take a similar stance regarding human rights violations by the Soviet Union or Iran?

✓ The real problem is the double standard which is applied by the United Nations and some of the specialized agencies in their consideration of human rights violations. Whereas South Africa and a few Western states are repeatedly cited for violations, little or no public notice is taken of violations by the Soviet Union, Eastern European, and other governments which are members of the majority voting bloc in the UN.

Throughout the United Nations system, the United States must be prepared to enter the international arena of diverse interests and ideologies, to defend its own values such as for a free press and democratic rights, and to tolerate the inevitable disagreements and divisions of the world system in which we must advocate the values for which this nation stands.

#### 9. The "rights of peoples" need not detract from individual freedoms.

U.S. delegations have objected to the new formulation of human rights in UNESCO. Some American observers foresee in the forthcoming discussions of "rights of peoples" at UNESCO a scrapping of support for individual rights in favor of collective rights. (The term originated in the Organization of African Unity, not the USSR, as some believe).

The term "rights of peoples" is not in itself objectionable. In fact, it can and should be defined to reflect the traditional concerns of the U.S.: for example, the rights of peoples includes self-determination, as American as Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. The rights of peoples should be combined with individual rights, rather than reflect a dichotomy.

The democratic countries have stood by the Human Rights sections of the Helsinki Accords for nine years. The Eastern Bloc nations have been discomfited, but they remain in the fray. It would be extremely shortsighted of America to withdraw from efforts to further define and elaborate human rights. The U.S. should seize the initiative and become a key

Reviewing the State Department's charges of "politicization" of UNESCO, the House Foreign Affairs Staff Report of February 1984 concluded:

In sum, the Department's conclusion that UNESCO is "politicized" and acts against U.S. interests because it spends \$1 million on disarmament studies, entertains discussions and adopts resolutions on people's rights, and provides minimal support for refugee education seems to be an attempt to denigrate the Organization's performance on extraordinarily weak grounds. To be sure, the United States and other interested states should monitor these programs and seek to influence their direction in concert with other interested states. However, if \$2 million of UNESCO programs are politicized out of a total program of \$186 million, it is difficult to sustain the argument that "politicization" should serve as a basis for immediate, unilateral withdrawal.

participant in that debate.

It should be noted that UNESCO has a long history of concern for human rights. The United States actually initiated UNESCO's Human Rights Committee, which has assisted victims of repression in the Soviet Union, Eastern Bloc countries, Latin America, and elsewhere. In the 1983 U.S. State Department Report to Congress, it was noted that the UNESCO Special Committee on Human Rights:

...allows any individual or nongovernmental organization with reliable knowledge of a violation of human rights within UNESCO's spheres of competence to seek the Organization's assistance in achieving a "friendly" solution. Its procedures, which are confidential, are among the most advanced in the international system, and they have led to positive results in a number of cases.

After carefully reviewing the specific proposals for discussion of the rights of peoples in UNESCO, the staff study of the U.S. House of Representative's



Committee on Foreign Affairs summarized the issue as follows:

Five points should be made in this regard. First, debate on people's rights may be inevitable, as noted above, but such a debate does not necessarily diminish the legitimacy of individual human rights. In this respect, the U.S. position would be stronger diplomatically if it would ratify the various international human rights conventions pending in the Senate. Second, the whole issue of people's rights and human rights and the long-term implications they raise for U.S. foreign policy in a pluralist, complex, interdependent world deserves considerably more attention than mere opposition to peoples' rights. Otherwise how can the United States and its Western allies manage and influence the debate and its outcome? Third, U.S. categorical opposition to people's rights and support for individual human rights runs the risk of denying our own recognition of certain group rights such as the right of self-determination.

Fourth, the U.S. Government should consult with Western allies and other like-minded governments to formulate strategies for managing proposals regarding people's rights in UNESCO, as they will continue to be made. Fifth, the United States helped establish UNESCO's human rights section and had encouraged international conferences and programs on the teaching of human rights that American and foreign educators have found to be quite valuable. Yet the U.S. decision to withdraw appears not to have accounted for this and other benefits. In sum, and particularly in view of the U.S. nonratification of most of the international human rights conventions that exalt individual rights, U.S. objection to UNESCO's discussion of peoples' rights seems an insufficient basis for a decision to withdraw from the Organization. It also obscures the fact that the United States has been able to use the UNESCO forum to promote U.S. interests in human rights.

#### 10. UNESCO itself does not advocate a "statist" approach to issues.

UNESCO does not advocate a "statist" philosophy that nations should direct, control, or determine the educational and cultural development of their people. Its program provides educational materials and training for teachers regardless of the system used by the member countries. It is in the nature of international organizations to comprise countries with different viewpoints and systems of government. That is the main reason for their existence. The point of an international body like UNESCO is to provide a forum where differences of attitude and outlook can be reconciled amicably and constructive policies can be hammered out.

While the membership of UNESCO reflects every

political tendency and ideology, the majority of UNESCO members are from the Third World whose governments operate the national school system from a national department of ministry of education instead of local school boards. Many of those countries also administer cultural matters from a national ministry. Only a few Western countries have a tradition of locally administered schools and private sponsorship of the arts. School systems are nationally administered in most European countries, but it does not follow that their governments use them to carry out a "statist" philosophy, as is the case in the USSR and other similar regimes.

#### 11. The USSR does not exercise inordinate control of UNESCO programs.

The USSR, with 26 posts, has less than one-third the number of professional UNESCO staff positions held by the United States, and less than France (54), West Germany (31), and Japan (27). While almost

40 percent of all professional staff originate from Western Europe and North America, only eight percent have come from Eastern Bloc countries.

The Soviet Union plays the same aggressive role in UNESCO that it plays in other UN bodies. Many votes are taken by a process of log-rolling, as prevails in the U.S. Congress. Thus, some African and Latin American states are inclined to support Arab positions in Middle East questions (even when they have little sympathy for them) because they want Arab support in economic development or anti-colonial issues. The major powers support both groups whenever it suits their purpose. In so doing they gain support for initiatives of their own, as well as some immunity from attack on their own policies and behavior. For instance, the Soviet Union's "peace offensive" seeks to capitalize on world public opinion favoring disarmament, a theme included in some UNESCO programs, and to gain some leverage against the West.

By themselves, however, the Soviets cannot and do not control or even come close to exerting a major influence on the program. They may take advantage of proposals made by others, when they can, to insert ideas of their own. They also exert influence by virtue of the much greater effort they have made, as compared with the U.S., to send experienced and well prepared delegates to the General Conference and to propose competent people to the UNESCO Secretariat.

The Soviet Union does attach importance to UNESCO. A Soviet foreign affairs journal in 1982 stated:

The useful work done by UNESCO is well known and much valued in the Soviet Union. Taking part in this work are dozens of Soviet

ministries and organizations and hundreds of people working in the field of culture, education and science. This work in the Soviet Union is coordinated by a special interdepartmental body, the USSR Commission for UNESCO, on which serve some 70 high ranking representatives of ministries, agencies and scientific institutions and public organizations.

The Soviet Union joined UNESCO well after it began and soon learned how to act effectively there. At about the same time, the U.S. began losing interest. The USSR has steadily enlarged its National Commission for UNESCO, while the U.S. has reduced the U.S. Commission's effectiveness by steadily cutting its staff support and budget. The USSR Commission plays an active role in formulating and carrying out Soviet policies through UNESCO. The U.S. Commission is generally ignored by American officials. The USSR has enlarged its staff support at UNESCO/Paris. The U.S. has a small staff there and rotates them frequently before they can provide consistent counsel and service. Most important, Moscow recognizes that UNESCO is a useful forum for discussing those issues of most direct concern to the entire developing world. The U.S., at UNESCO, seems far less concerned with these matters.

In addition to defending the physical security of the United States, it is important for us to defend and advocate American beliefs and values in international forums. A heavy Soviet commitment of resources to UNESCO requires the commitment of U.S. resources adequate to stand up to the country's adversaries—not unilateral intellectual disarmament.

## 12. Disarmament studies in UNESCO constitute a small proportion of programs.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee Staff comments:

In fact, UNESCO's budget allocation for the education sector is about \$135.7 million or 37 percent of its 1984-85 regular budget. In what sense are educational programs politicized when disarmament studies cost only \$1 million or less than one percent of the entire program? One of

UNESCO's most important programs is eradication of illiteracy for which the 1984-85 approved program budget authorized about \$15 million. This program could have long-term effects on improving the capability of an electorate to vote more intelligently in elections, a long-term political effect. Staff recommends that the United States and other interested states carefully monitor

these disarmament studies and take appropriate action to insure that they reflect Western views as well as the view of others. The United States might also encourage UNESCO members to refer the preparation of those studies to the UN Institute of Disarmament in an effort to achieve budget reductions when necessary. However, to attribute politicization to UNESCO as a failure in its performance because of the \$1 million cost of the

program seems hardly sufficient justification for U.S. withdrawal; especially when the U.S./ UNESCO policy review notes that "UNESCO's work in the field of peace research and arms control and disarmament education has been of significant value to American researchers and teachers according to the consortium of Peace Research Education and Development."

### 13. Israel is not being attacked in UNESCO.

Every UN forum has been used by some Arab states to attack Israeli policies. Such attacks have in fact diminished lately, due largely to the strong opposition of the United States and other Western countries. It should be remembered, however, that the debate seeking to equate "Zionism with racism" occurred in the United Nations and not at UNESCO.

The United States cannot prevent such attacks, but it has blocked proposals that would have led to actions harmful to Israel, such as denying that country the right to participate in a UNESCO body. Indeed, continued U.S. participation in UNESCO is necessary to protect Israeli interests, as that government has made clear to the U.S.

The U.S. Congress has authorized the State Department to suspend its participation in UNESCO and withhold payment of its assessed contribution if any illegal action is taken against Israel. Congressman James Leach noted on March 8, 1984:

In the case of the Israeli question, Assistant Secretary of State Gregory Newell acknowledged at a hearing held by the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations on February 7, 1984, that the Israeli question was not a problem for the U.S. and that this particular concern was not a reason for the U.S. withdrawal. In a report to Congress in February 1983 (required under section 108 of P.L. 97-241) the Administra-

tion stated that while there have been a number of unacceptable resolutions on the Middle East questions, the worst excesses have been avoided. It further said that efforts to deny Israel her right to participate, such as had taken place in the IAEA, have not prospered in recent years in UNESCO. Why? Largely, the report explains, because of the "forceful presentation of U.S. Government views, skillful diplomatic intervention by the Director general, and help of moderates in the Group of 77." Clearly, on this major issue, the U.S. has forcefully presented its case and successfully carried the day. It is unclear to me how the United States can actively defend our own interests, let alone the right of Israel to participate in UNESCO, from an empty chair.

Assistant Secretary of State Newell in a briefing on December 29, 1983, was asked, "You didn't mention Israel in this list of problems. That has been a problem, has it not, in UNESCO?" He replied, "It hasn't of recent months. UNESCO has behaved well on that question."

U.S. Ambassador Edmund Hennelly, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Biennial UNESCO General Conference in November 1983, commented: "...the Conference was not politicized, i.e., Israeli credentials were not challenged. Anti-Israeli rhetoric was muted or nonexistent."

**14. Services to the PLO and African liberation movements are small in scale and largely educational.**

UNESCO does not provide support for terrorism; however, UNESCO, like other UN bodies, has accorded non-voting observer representation at its meetings to groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the African National Congress (ANC), and the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO). Both the ANC and SWAPO are recognized by the Organization of African Unity as the official representatives of the African peoples of South Africa and Namibia. Some other UNESCO services are also provided, consisting primarily of supplying educational materials and training teachers for the school systems which serve the children of such groups. The UN, which administers the relief program for Palestinian refugee camps, has designated UNESCO to provide educational services for the camps. Few would contend that helping to educate Palestinian children contributes to terrorism.

The total allotted to all these movements from assessed budgetary funds for teacher training, fellowships, educational equipment and materials, teacher salaries, travel funds, and tuition and fees have averaged approximately \$200,000 per year in the three years 1981, 1982, and 1983.

Most support for these organizations is given through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

The State Department specifically charges UNESCO is politicized by giving \$350,000 per year

for PLO fellowships. Reviewing this charge, the House Foreign Affairs Committee Staff Report of February 1984 states:

There can be little doubt that the seating of the PLO as well as the issue of UNESCO budget allocations for PLO-related activities represent a highly politicized matter which the United States has strenuously opposed despite overwhelming majority support in UNESCO. The 1974 General Conference did seat the PLO as an observer and recognized the right of other NLMs recognized by the OAU to participate in the General Conference. (The United Nations in 1974 also seated the PLO as observers contrary to U.S. wishes, but regrettably supported by the majority of U.N. members.) However, Congress in both the Foreign Relations Authorization Act and in the Foreign Assistance Act prohibits U.S. contributions to the United Nations for support of PLO activities in the Secretariat or policy bodies of the United Nations. Thus, the proportionate share of the U.S.-assessed contribution to UNESCO for such programs is annually deducted from the U.S. payment. Yet, neither the Congress nor the Department of State has yet found U.N. support of PLO activities a sufficient reason for withdrawing from the United Nations or its specialized agencies.

**15. UNESCO has taken no actions to end freedom of the press.**

UNESCO has taken no action to control journalists or to limit press freedom. However, justifiable concerns have been aroused by proposals by the Soviets and a few others to misuse the New World Information and Communications Order (NWICO). Actually, NWICO was conceived by the developing countries as a means of helping poor countries to expand their mass media facilities in order to enable them to avoid a total dependence on Western media and to communicate their own views more effectively. It has, of

course, provided a tempting vehicle for proposals by the Soviets to limit press freedom.

UNESCO, however, has not approved or taken any action on such proposals. The negotiations on communications issues at the 1983 General Conference generally favored the Western free press position. There were 49 communications resolutions. Of these, 33, including those of the United States and its friends, were not objectionable to free-press advocates. Of the remaining 16, the worst, introduced by

the Soviet Union and East Germany, were withdrawn without ever reaching the floor. Moreover, for the first time in a decade the Biennial Conference approved programs to study the "watchdog" role of the press, examine governmental censorship and treat the controversial NWICO as an evolving process rather than a set of regulations. Each of these programs represents a gain for supporters of a free press.

That is why the observer of the World Press Freedom Committee at the General Conference, Dana Bullen, said: "If anyone is looking for an assault on the media at this conference serious enough to justify United States withdrawal, they won't find it." (New York Times, Nov. 17, 1983)

Of all the resolutions adopted at UNESCO on information and communication, and of the statements by the Director-General, none advocates licensing or codes of conduct for journalists, much less censorship. This was verified in a February 25, 1983, report of the State Department to Congress, which stated, "UNESCO to date has debated but not implemented policies or procedures of an anti-free press nature."

It is commonly believed in the United States that UNESCO plans or advocates licensing journalists. This is not true. Indeed, one recommendation in the Final Report of the International Commission for the Study of Communications Problems stated, "All countries should take steps to assure the admittance of foreign correspondents and facilitate their collection and transmission of news."

The 1980 UNESCO resolution setting forth the elements of a "new world information order" includes freedom of the press and information, the freedom of journalists and all professionals in the communication media, and removal of internal and external obstacles to a free flow and a wider and better balanced dissemination of information and ideas.

U.S. newspapers repeatedly attack a "new world information order" discussed at UNESCO. But news reports and editorials rarely make clear that a "new order" has never been defined formally at UNESCO, that U.S. delegates of several administrations, including the present one, have accepted the general term without definition, and that last November the General Conference stipulated that a "new information order" is an evolving process, not an imposed set

of regulations intended to hamper the free flow of information.

In fact, proposals threatening the free flow of information, as independent journalists describe it, have been repeatedly rejected at UNESCO. Moreover, at the last General Conference the U.S. Delegation was instrumental in pushing through recommendations to study the "watchdog" role of the press and the effects of government censorship.

Commenting on the gains made on press freedom at the 1982 UNESCO General Conference, Dana Bullen, Executive Director of the World Press Freedom Committee, noted:

While plenty of loopholes for bad ideas remain, a surprising number of improvements were endorsed for UNESCO's Medium-Term Plan for 1984-89 during marathon negotiations at the 158-nation organization's Extraordinary General Conference that ended December 3.

James D. Phillips, former Director of the State Department's Office of Communications and UNESCO Affairs, said, "We went beyond damage control and got some positive things in there. There were some basic principles we couldn't compromise on and we didn't."

Among the gains at the Paris conference, according to *Presstime*, October 1982, were:

Recognition of the "watchdog" role of the press against abuses of power.

Rephrasing of wording that called for international attention to the "content" of news.

Language recognizing that "censorship and self-censorship" restrict freedom of information

Apparent ruling out of further consideration of controversial items in "Part B" of the MacBride Report [*Presstime*, June 1980, p. 14]

Deletion of a call for study of the "respective responsibilities" of those involved in communication

Broadening a goal of building "national press agencies" to support both "public or private press agencies."

**16. The New International Economic Order (NIEO) has not been central to UNESCO programs.**

The NIEO is a UN and not a UNESCO declaration. However, some UNESCO debates, publications, and program activities are replete with references to that declaration. As an organization committed to the needs of underdeveloped countries, UNESCO cannot avoid discussion of the declaration in the areas of education, science, and technology.

Many Third World nations have been thrown into economic depressions by the worldwide recession of the 1980s and the lower and unstable prices on the world market for the raw material commodities they sell. Pressed by their citizens for better health standards, education, and standards of living, these younger nations seek guarantees of market stability, high prices for their commodities, cheaper loans, and more development assistance from the wealthier nations. These ideas are reflected in the NIEO, but it is important to note that the NIEO proposals have no legal force nor any implementing machinery.

What needs to be taken seriously, however, is the fact that the declaration does reflect the aspirations of most developing countries in which the United States has important economic and political interests. At a time when the U.S. is running a massive deficit in its balance of trade, it must recognize that the developing world already takes about one-third of its

exports and that the future expansion of its international trade must take place with developing countries, since the European and other industrial countries are now competitors. In expressing concerns about the NIEO program, the U.S. should take care not to do so in a manner which appears to deny the development needs of the Third World.

Commenting on the NIEO issue, Walter Mertineit, Vice President of the West German Commission for UNESCO, noted:

The U.S. allegation that UNESCO is ruled by a coalition of Third World and Soviet-bloc countries seeking to create a dictatorial economic and information order has little basis in fact. The idea of a new world economic order is an expression of impatience on the part of the developing countries with the ineffectiveness of international organizations in which they control a two-thirds majority but nevertheless are unable to change the balance of power. The weakness of the idea is that it occasionally leads its proponents to aggressive rhetoric and unrealistic draft resolutions.

*Die Zeit*, 1.6.84

**17. No actions have been taken by UNESCO against U.S. corporations.**

UNESCO has done no more than consider proposals alleging the need for a Transnational Corporate Responsibility Code. In this it is following in the wake of the United Nations, which has been at work on such a code over the past decade. In the UN the discussion began in an atmosphere of hostility to American corporations, but the discussion has become much more moderate and balanced of late, due largely to the positions taken by the U.S. and most other Western countries. U.S. delegations have made clear that they will not feel bound to observe any code, even a voluntary code, that is contrary to the interests of the United States.

U.S. delegations have also opposed any UNESCO activity in this field as beyond its competence and an unnecessary duplication of work underway in the United Nations and the International Labor Organization (ILO), as well as of similar voluntary codes already adopted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Economic Community (EEC). A proposal to bring UNESCO into the business of establishing a code of conduct for international corporations was gutted due to strong diplomatic U.S. activities at the last General Conference. Continued participation in UNESCO is needed to head off the elaboration of any code harmful to U.S. interests.

Americans are interested to see that corporations operate responsibly abroad where they are not guided by U.S. law regarding workers' rights, hazardous

substances, and product integrity, but these matters are most properly the concern of other international organizations.

**18. The United States is not underrepresented in the UNESCO professional staff.**

In the UNESCO Secretariat, the United States has the largest number of professional posts of any nation (82 of 814 at the end of 1983). Although the United States is only one of 161 member nations, it holds more than eight percent of the professional posts, plus 11 professional employees not subject to professional quotas and 47 General Service employees. France is second with 54. Approximately five times as many professional staff members originate from North America and Western Europe as from the Soviet bloc, and the West provides 63 percent of all staff. The Soviet Union had only 36 professional posts at the end of 1983.

For 11 of the first 12 years of UNESCO's existence, an American citizen held the post of Director-General or Deputy Director-General of the organization. Indeed, there has been a U.S. national in at least one of the three-top ranking posts of Director-General for 30 out of 38 years of UNESCO's history. Currently, an American holds the post of Assistant Director-General for Administration. Moreover, a U.S. citizen served as the editor of *The UNESCO Courier* for about 30 years prior to his retirement in the late 1970s, and over the last 17 years, three

editors of the science journal *Impact* have been Americans. Americans hold other important posts within the organization. For example, recently a U.S. citizen was appointed to UNESCO's International Bureau of Education in Geneva.

The number of U.S. nationals on the UNESCO staff (professional posts under the regular budget, not posts on operational projects financed by voluntary funds) is slightly below what is known as the "desirable range." This is a recent development and could be corrected by appointment of four or five more Americans. The decline in U.S. nationals is partly the result of the retirement of those recruited in the 1947-1960 period.

More important may be the distribution of Americans within the Secretariat by sector and by grade of post, as well as by age (career development). To assure a balanced distribution requires more staff work by the State Department than has been available, as well as close monitoring of UNESCO recruitment by the Permanent Delegation.

In light of the U.S. experience in the ILO, it is likely that the U.S. withdrawal would lead to a reduction of the American staff of UNESCO.

**19. The UNESCO budget had a small increase this year and the U.S. contribution is only \$25.8 million.**

The budget has grown over time with inflation and program growth, but is not far out of line with other UN agencies. The 1984-85 biennial budget approved by the General Conference last fall totaled \$374.4 million, or \$187.2 million per year. For the previous period, the annual budget was \$208.5 million. As these figures show, UNESCO's new budget is smaller per annum than the preceding one. The figures must be read with care; the nominal budget does not coincide with real costs because part of the entire global budget was intended as a reserve

against fluctuations in currency rates. Since the dollar was strong against the French franc, members have actually been given a rebate of \$70,813,000, an amount that is only about one-half of the total surplus of the previous three-year budget period. Annually, that amounts to a reduction of about \$23.6 million. Thus, the actual UNESCO budget for that period was approximately \$184.9 million a year rather than the apparent \$208.5 million. Since the entire rebate has just become available, it has been applied to reduce what members owe UNESCO as

their shares of the budget for the current year. For the United States, an obligation of \$46.8 million (25 percent of \$187.2 million) is reduced by the rebate and other reductions to an actual payment of \$25 million. Last year, the U.S. paid twice as much under the previous budget.

According to UNESCO sources, other UN agencies have recently adopted budget increases larger than UNESCO's—the International Labor Organization increased by four percent, the World Health Organization by 12 percent, and the Food and Agriculture

Organization by 15 percent. These figures compare with UNESCO's real increase of 2.5 percent according to UNESCO officials, or three to five percent according to Assistant Secretary Newell.

Mr. Newell has confirmed, moreover, that the actual U.S. assessment for the current fiscal year will be \$25.8 million, significantly less than in recent years, owing to the rebate system, the strength of the dollar, and the budget reduction negotiated by the United States at the 1983 General Conference.

## 20. The UNESCO salary structure is high, like that of all international agencies and foreign missions.

Like other UN agencies, UNESCO professional salaries are based on those prevailing in the best civil service, which is the United States. To this base salary, as in the U.S. Foreign Service, allowances are added to compensate for the extra expense of schooling, maintaining more than one residence, home leave, language instruction, etc. This practice, known as the Noblemaire Principle, was established in 1920 by a study commission of the League of Nations. Although there are aspects of this salary structure to which the U.S. rightly objects, these objections apply throughout the UN system; they are not peculiar to UNESCO.

The total salaries of UNESCO staff constitute less than one-half of the UNESCO budget, a proportion which has been declining since the early 1970s when it peaked at about 65 percent.

What should concern the U.S. more is the quality of the UNESCO Secretariat, which appears to have diminished in recent years. A major effort must be made to strengthen its effectiveness by persuading the Director-General to hire the most competent available applicants and turn aside pressure from some member governments on behalf of less qualified persons.

STAT

## 21. The proportion of staff in the Paris headquarters reflects the types of tasks performed by the Organization.

With approximately two-thirds of its professional and general staff located in Paris, UNESCO has less concentration in its headquarters than the International Labor Organization, World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), each of which has 74-75 percent of staff located at central headquarters.

The U.S. would be pleased if UNESCO were to allocate much more of its regular budget funds to projects in Third World and other developing countries. Yet the United States has always taken the position that, while UN agencies must have field offices to handle their activities in member countries,

the bulk of funding for UN system technical assistance programs in member countries should come from voluntary contributions by governments and not from assessed budgets. Otherwise, the U.S. would be submitting to what amounts to a tax levied by the large majority of recipient countries against the minority of large contributors.

Moreover, while UNESCO does provide technical assistance within its fields of competence to many underdeveloped countries, it is not a development agency as such. The bulk of its activities concerns all of its members and is addressed to communities of scholars, educators, scientists, and development



specialists in the world at large. As a result, most UNESCO activities require extensive multinational planning and execution, resulting in a focus on publications, communications, foreign language inter-

pretation, conferences and seminars, for which a large central headquarters staff in Paris is a relevant and legitimate allocation of resources.

**22. According to a 1979 study, the proportion of UNESCO budget allocated to administration is not inordinately high.**

UNESCO is not itself a development agency; rather, its mandate is to develop and to facilitate international cooperation within its fields of competence. This requires a large headquarters staff to handle interpretation and translation into six official languages, to print its many publications, and to service its General Conferences and other meetings. Programs and projects are not self-executing.

Following an extensive study of UNESCO plans and budgets, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) presented a report to Congress dated September 14, 1979, entitled "UNESCO Programming and Budgeting Need Greater U.S. Attention." In the report, the Comptroller General of the United States gave the following assessment:

Although UNESCO activities were not studied in detail during that review, we regarded the management procedures to be unique and forward-looking compared to other UN agencies examined; and further, as having the potential for improving the effectiveness of U.S. participation in UNESCO and in other international organizations as well....After closer study of UNESCO planning and budgeting processes, we believe they are conceptually sound and permit progress toward improved disclosure of program aims and their financial implications for member governments.

UNESCO operations are subject to the continuing scrutiny of the UN Joint Inspection Unit and an external auditor, the United Kingdom Comptroller and Auditor General, neither of whom have questioned UNESCO procedures or management.

The UNESCO staff administers an extensive and varied program of concrete operational activities. For example, according to UNESCO sources, between 1979 and 1983 UNESCO carried out over a thousand

"operational projects" in nearly one hundred member states, for which purpose it mustered nearly \$400 million, to say nothing of the hundreds of other projects which it helped to implement by providing the services of experts and advisors or by acting as an intermediary. These "projects" cover a multitude of undertakings, ranging from educational planning and reform in an African country to the restoration of a Buddhist temple or the construction of an oceanographic research vessel.

During the same period, UNESCO was involved in campaigns which brought literacy to over 15 million adults and young people not enrolled in schools. In 1980 alone it took part in the training of nearly 30,000 teachers.

Since 1978, UNESCO has raised more than \$40 million for 29 international campaigns to safeguard historic monuments and sites. Among these are Venice, the Acropolis, the Plaza Vieja in Havana, the island of Goree in Senegal, and Sri Lanka's "Cultural Triangle." More than a billion dollars must be found to complete these campaigns.

The organization spends nearly \$30 million a year on its international scientific programs, such as the International Hydrological Program, the International Geological Co-operation Program, or the Program on Man and the Biosphere (MAB). The member states contribute more than \$500 million to these programs, and over 20,000 scientists are taking part in them. Every year, more than 4,000 researchers receive training under UNESCO's auspices.

The U.S. General Accounting Office is conducting a review of UNESCO management regarding personnel, budget, and administration at the request of Congress and will make evaluations and recommendations later this year.

**23. The U.S. has been successful in participating in UNESCO and accomplishing its goals there when it has exerted strong leadership.**

The delegation to the 22nd General Conference in October-November 1983 secured a number of victories for U.S. positions. Ambassador Edmund P. Hennelly, Head of the U.S. Delegation, has testified that the conference was the least politicized in recent memory, UNESCO's communications sector was improved, an appropriate distinction was made between traditional human rights and the rights of peoples, the proposed budget was reduced, a victory was won on the issue of the transnational corporations' code of conduct, and the U.S. won election, in secret ballots, to all five major committees for which it was a candidate. (Among negatives, Ambassador Hennelly listed the U.S. failure to secure further reductions in the budget, and a lopsided vote in favor of holding the 1985 General Conference in Bulgaria.) Firm and forthright leadership can clearly pay off.

However, despite these victories, there has been a decline in the quality of U.S. participation in UNESCO over the past decade or more. Unlike the delegations sent to represent the U.S. at earlier General Conferences, in recent years more than one delegation has included *no* recognizable representative of U.S. scientific, cultural and educational communities. It is not surprising that U.S. delegations which excluded the best American expertise were bewildered by the UNESCO program.

In general, U.S. delegations have included too many persons being rewarded for domestic political purposes and not enough delegates or alternates with any understanding of, or interest in, the UNESCO program. Moreover, they lacked experience in international conference procedures and, in that sense, they were no match for the professional conference experts fielded by many other delegations, such as the Soviet Union.

John E. Fobes, former chairman of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO (1979-1981) and a former UNESCO Deputy Director-General (1971-1977), commented on U.S. participation and noted:

UNESCO certainly has serious problems. Some of those who have worked with that multifaceted organization have given more thought to those

problems and to solutions than have the U.S. Government and the news media, both of which appear unwilling to bother to learn all the facts or to give the necessary attention to remedial action.

A number of other governments—north and south, including our closest allies—are also concerned about the health of UNESCO. They are dismayed, however, that the U.S. does not adequately consult and concert ideas and action with them, failing to give time and effort and often acting with apparent narrowness of vision.

The U.S. shares heavy responsibility for the present state of affairs in UNESCO—its general conference, executive board, secretariat and national commissions. In fact, U.S. neglect of these bodies and its low estimation of them have engendered feelings among friendly governments ranging from sadness to dismay and even anger. The most powerful country in the world in education, science, culture and communications has failed to play its role fully and to exercise its strengths in those areas.

What is crying for attention is the way in which the U.S. participates in the organization, the way in which it collaborates with other governments and the ways in which we can help to bring about improvements in the organized intellectual and cultural cooperation that is so important to the world—including the U.S.

Threats of withdrawal are simply poor excuses, a copping out. What is needed is that we make known our purposes and our readiness and willingness to fulfill our responsibilities to the world (while protecting our interests); that we state more clearly what it is that we want changed and how that could be brought about (not simply by reducing a budget), and that we convince others that we are prepared to stick in, both for the battles and for the constructive projects that are crying out for our full participation.

Lawrence Finkelstein, a long time observer of

UNESCO and Professor of Political Science at Northern Illinois University, has commented:

...the United States has not used well the leadership capabilities it still has, even in the changing world environment. In UNESCO, for example, the U.S. essentially stopped trying to be an effective leader about thirty years ago. The result was that others took over and it was only belatedly and somewhat suddenly that we discovered about ten years ago that being on the losing side could hurt on matters of importance—primarily issues affecting Israel and the questions about freedom of the media and the new information order....

The experience of the last ten years or so in UNESCO has been that when the United States takes UNESCO seriously, identifies its objectives clearly, organizes effectively both the governmental and private sector participation it needs to assert its views, and pursues well conceived tactics, it can achieve what it needs. To argue from this record that the U.S. interest is served by getting out is to project a strange and harmful image of the credibility of the United States as an international actor.

## **APPENDIX I**

### **ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR UNESCO AS OF DECEMBER 1983**

Alliance for Environmental Education	American Society for Engineering Education
American Home Economics Association	National Association of Broadcasters
National Academy of Sciences	AFRICARE
International Council of Fine Arts Deans	Women's American ORT (Organization on the Rehabilitation Through Training)
Association of Science Technology Centers	American Geological Institute
Consortium on Peace, Research, Education and Development	American Jewish Committee
Women's International League of Peace and Freedom	National Council of Churches of Christ
International Center of Photography	Association of American Geographers
National Wildlife Federation	International Studies Association
International Council of Monuments and Sites	American Council of Learned Societies
American Psychological Association	American Council on Education
American Association of Community and Junior Colleges	ASPIRA of America, Inc.
One Hundred Black Men, Inc.	League of Women Voters
American Academy of Arts and Sciences	American Association for the Advancement of Science
American Student Association	American Economic Association
Association for Asian Studies	National Indian Education Association
American Association of University Women	International Reading Association
American Theatre Association	National Congress of Parents and Teachers
Council of Chief State School Officers	Freedom House
National Council of Jewish Women	Social Science Research Council
National Education Association	National Council of Negro Women
American Library Association	Sierra Club
American Anthropological Association	National Council for the Social Studies
American Society of International Law	American Sociological Association
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.	National Council of La Raza
American Political Science Association	American Newspaper Publishers Association
American Women in Radio and TV, Inc.	American Society for Information Science
Overseas Development Council	United Nations Association of the United States
Institute of International Education	World Wildlife Fund
National Science Teachers Association	Young Women's Christian Association

## APPENDIX II

### STATEMENTS REGARDING UNESCO BY U.S. SCIENCE, EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL, AND MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS

#### *Science:*

Scientific interests are responding, as in the past, that the U.S. must not withdraw. The response from the National Science Foundation review of the Natural Science Sector activities cites eight international UNESCO science activities as "distinctly beneficial" to the United States and notes, "No projects harmful to U.S. interests are reported." The report continues by listing seven major benefits U.S. science derives from participation in UNESCO and discusses the consequences of nonparticipation in the Organization's Natural Science Sector as follows:

The withdrawal of the United States from UNESCO science activities would lead to a significant reduction in the direct access the U.S. scientific community now enjoys to important data bases, localities, and scientific resources throughout the world. Withdrawal from UNESCO membership would result in a general decline in the leadership position the U.S. now holds in international science and also contribute to the further politicization of UNESCO in ways detrimental to U.S. national interests.

Similarly, the Foreign Secretary of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), responding to a State Department query, reported:

Certain sciences, particularly those concerned with the oceans, climate, the solid earth and the biosphere, depend critically on international cooperation. The assistance of governments is frequently required for access to areas and data needed by U.S. scientists working in these disciplines, and UNESCO is a forum in which such cooperation by governments can be achieved. There is much criticism leveled at UNESCO programs, structure and management, but, in the area of the sciences at least, there is no real alternative to UNESCO at the present time.

A third major organization, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, responded to

the U.S. UNESCO Commission as follows:

AAAS supports the conduct of the policy review of UNESCO participation by the U.S. and urges the interagency task force to make specific recommendations to strengthen the U.S. voice in UNESCO affairs. The U.S. should continue and enhance its active participation in UNESCO affairs.

A very long list of such statements on the need for U.S. scientific participation in UNESCO has appeared. The social science professional organizations, less satisfied with the UNESCO program than the natural sciences, emphasize that as a nation the U.S. must participate in UNESCO efforts. Given these responses, it is obvious that suggestions that the U.S. withdraw from UNESCO are not supported by the scientific community.

Would reduction in commitment, in fact, improve returns to the U.S. from continued involvement in UNESCO? Again, the responses to the question are unanimous in suggesting that improvement can be made not by reducing the commitment but by increasing it. Thus, the NSF report states:

The United States' negative attitude to its commitments, responsibilities, and participation within UNESCO hinders the achievement of U.S. national objectives.

The NSF report concludes:

A stronger leadership role in the United States is necessary to obtain maximal benefits from scientific participation in UNESCO. A high level commitment to the central management and coordination of all U.S. participation, coupled with increased resources to support programs of U.S. priority and interest, are essential steps to be taken to achieve national objectives within UNESCO.

The Foreign Secretary of NAS summarized the problem in his response by writing:

Without an appropriate and funded infrastruc-

ture to manage our investment in UNESCO, frustration is bound to continue.

For a change, a UN-related policy question seems clearly answered. The real question is whether the U.S. public and government can respond to the answer.

Similarly, the Social Science Research Council has commented:

UNESCO plays a unique role in providing opportunities for international contact among scientists on methodological issues, and also practical current problems in social, economic and political change. UNESCO, or its functional equivalent, is needed to improve the quality of our own social analytic skills and our knowledge of problems and events in other areas of the world. If UNESCO did not exist, we would have to invent it.

...a marginally greater investment of time and high quality people—not additional financial support—would bring the United States a much greater return on its investment.

#### *Education and Culture:*

U. S. educational and cultural associations have generally agreed with the evaluation of the U.S. State Department, as noted in its February 1983 report to Congress, which stated:

U.S. interests are generally well-served by UNESCO programs which are, for the most part, non-political and which can most effectively be pursued through international cooperation....The education, social sciences and culture sectors also produce some highly visible successes, such as the preservation and restoration of the Abu Simbel temples. The UNESCO-administered Universal Copyright Convention is an important international instrument which protects authors, publishers and other beneficiaries of copyrights.

(Report to the Congress Requested  
in Sections 108 and 109 of Public  
Law 97-241, February 24, 1983)

An official of the American Council on Education notes about UNESCO education programs that:

[UNESCO] programs focus heavily on issues in developing countries and are compatible with much of the U.S. AID development work of the United States....The work of the education sector provides opportunities for American specialists and academics to establish professional contacts with colleagues that would be difficult to have otherwise.

Similarly, in January 1984, the American Library Association Council concluded that:

UNESCO's programs are vital to the international flow of publications and information, to Universal Bibliographical Control, to international copyright, to the world wide promotion of books, libraries, publishing and literacy....the American Library Association deeply regrets the decision of the President of the U.S., on recommendation of the Secretary of State, to issue notice of the intention of the United States to withdraw from membership in UNESCO.

The Dean of the University of Pittsburgh School of Library and Information Science testified to Congress on March 15, 1984, that:

Over its 38 year history, UNESCO has promoted a broad range of important, effective programs to enhance access to information worldwide...creating a world climate that supports, facilitates and encourages the flow of essential scientific and technical data across national boundaries.

The National Wildlife Federation contributed a comment to the State Department Review of UNESCO in Fall 1983, stating:

We would like to take this opportunity to express our support for this country's participation in UNESCO's Man and the Biosphere Program (MAB). MAB is one of the few international conservation programs that combines ecological research with practical applications....This country's active participation in MAB is crucial to the success and effectiveness of the program. This program deserves to be included among the highest priorities of UNESCO activities.

At the same time, the National Educational Association commented:

We urge the continuance of United States participation in UNESCO. We believe that a means can be found to improve the performance of UNESCO functions without overt financial intimidation of the institution and its Secretariat; we hope for constructive U.S. effort toward that end. We suggest the strengthening of the U.S. National Commission to enable an increased flow of useful, timely information to Commission members and, through them, to the necessary constituency.

And the League of Women Voters noted:

The LWVUS supports the fundamental responsibilities of UNESCO: to help in the advancement and spread of knowledge; to give a vigorous impulse to the development of education and the spread of science; to work for knowledge and mutual understanding among nations. The LWVUS...urges that any reassessment of U.S. policy options toward UNESCO focus on a strategy of tough diplomacy on the one hand and practical accommodation on the other.

The American Association of University Women observed:

UNESCO is uniquely established and serves quite well as a data base source on education for women and girls, and is improving in its role as an information clearinghouse and transmittal library as well as catalyst for developing of social science research on women.

It has been beneficial to the world's women and U.S. women to have the immediate past and current Ambassador to UNESCO be women. Their advocacy of the importance of hiring women and serving women's needs through sector programs has a positive effect on the bureaucracy of UNESCO which has been primarily male.

The Institute of International Education stated:

UNESCO and its activities are important to the United States and to the Institute of International Education....UNESCO's own goals in education include equality of educational opportunity,

quality in curriculum and teaching methods, and literacy, all of which correspond to our own....it is better for the U.S. to participate in a forum where conflicting policies and world views meet than to be absent from such meetings.

The U.S./International Council on Monuments and Sites commented:

UNESCO is a vital organization, having made many significant and immeasurable contributions to cultural heritage worldwide and to the U.S. This is the only vehicle through which the U.S. public sector can identify with the world family of sovereign nations concerned with heritage....Contributions from the international community of government and private sources have been channeled to 27 international campaigns since the first one at Nubia. These UNESCO missions and their work are respected around the world for setting high standards and for being of the highest professional calibre. U.S. professionals have been involved in a number of these campaigns.

*Press:*

Several national newspapers provided editorial support initially for the decision of the Administration to withdraw; however, the American Newspaper Publishers Association has commented:

U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO almost certainly would encourage greater activity by totalitarian governments which seek to restrict information and press freedom both internationally and domestically....

We feel that in order to continue strong U.S. support for the principles of free expression, freedom of the press and the international free flow of information, the U.S. should remain in UNESCO. At the same time, we understand that American policy in intergovernmental organizations must serve the broad spectrum of national interests. If U.S. policy evolves in such a way that it is advisable to withdraw from UNESCO, or to restrict our financial participation in UNESCO, we believe such action should be taken in concert with a number of

other like-minded UNESCO member states. Unilateral action by the U.S. without the support of Western allies could severely damage efforts within UNESCO to advocate freedom of expression as a fundamental human right.

Similarly, the President and Executive Committee of Freedom House, an organization which has monitored UNESCO communications and press affairs, has commented:

...the United States should not only continue its full membership in UNESCO but expand and intensify our participation in the affairs of the organization. We address this to you because we know that your Administration is undertaking an extensive reassessment of the value of UNESCO to this country while weighing our continued membership in that organization.



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## United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 2, 1984

Executive Registry

84 - 9201/3

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : NSC - Mr. Robert Kimmitt  
 CIA -   
 USIA - Mr. C. William La Salle

25X1

SUBJECT: UNESCO Strategy

The President decided last December 23 that the United States would withdraw from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), effective at the end of 1984.

Extensive efforts to reform UNESCO were generated by this decision. To evaluate the extent to which significant and permanent reforms might have been achieved during 1984, and to analyze comments from relevant sources, the individuals listed below are requested to serve on the International Political Committee (IPC) that will address these issues. Should it be necessary, the IPC will convey recommendations to the Special Planning Group (SPG) for final disposition by the President.

The first meeting of the IPC, a preliminary discussion, will be held November 9 at 2:00 p.m. in Under Secretary Armacost's office, Room 7240, Main State. The participants will be contacted concerning the specific agenda. Background materials will be provided by the Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO). Membership of the IPC for this purpose includes:

Chairman: Under Secretary Armacost  
 Members : Charles Wick - USIA  
           Ralph DeVries - White House Science Office  
            - CIA  
           Walter Raymond - NSC  
           Gregory Newell - State/IO

25X1

*Charles Hill*  
 Charles Hill  
 Executive Secretary

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## The Soviet Navy after Gorshkov

By Dr G. TILL

*The author is Principal Lecturer in the Department of History and International Affairs at the Royal Naval College Greenwich and Visiting Lecturer in the Department of War Studies at King's College, London.*

Even Soviet admirals do not live for ever and there are plenty of signs that Admiral Sergei Gorshkov is approaching the end of a long and distinguished career. One of the relatively few successful naval commanders of the Great Patriotic War, Gorshkov became Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy in 1956. In that position, he supervised the transition of the Navy from a large but essentially local force primarily intended to assure the defence of Soviet territory in its narrowest sense to a substantial blue-water force capable of seriously contesting the US Navy's mastery of the oceans. The Soviet Union is now a global rather than a local superpower and Sergei Gorshkov has made a vital contribution to that most important of post-war developments. In 1976 Gorshkov presented his case in a book, *The Sea Power of the State*, the second and even more interesting edition of which appeared in 1979. (Sadly the 1979 English edition is a translation of the first edition.)

Such an unprecedented publication attracted enormous interest in the West. Naval analysts fell over themselves deciding whether it was advocacy or announcement, whether Gorshkov was urging the unpersuaded to adopt the naval policies he described or was simply stating the Politburo's current and future line. Quite a few analysts even saw the book as Gorshkov's last will and testament and looked for puffs of smoke coming from the chimneys of Moscow's main naval headquarters which would signify Gorshkov's going out to pasture. As it turned out, such obituaries were on the premature side, but this time it really does seem to be true. The analysts have even decided Gorshkov's most likely successor, namely Admiral Vladimir N. Chernavin, already Chief of the Main Naval Staff and a First Deputy Commander of the Soviet Navy. A submariner who commanded the Northern Fleet for four years, Chernavin is a candidate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and notably secure doctrinally.

But the really interesting thing about the process of succession seems to be that the old man is having to be persuaded to accept his gold watch and go. In an exceptionally perceptive and persuasive recent article in the *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, Robert C. Suggs put forward the idea that an obscure but important theoretical dispute in the pages of the Soviet naval digest *Morskoi Sbornik* over the past year or so signified a substantial attack on Gorshkov's views and should best be seen as part of an orchestrated

attempt to replace him. Put briefly, Vice Admiral K. Stalbo (for long considered to be a Gorshkov man) wrote a couple of (to Westerners) deeply obscure articles on the development and employment of a navy in the April and May 1981 editions of *Morskoi Sbornik*. These articles have been subjected to quite unprecedented criticism occasionally bordering on the abusive. Significantly, Admiral Chernavin was one of the critics. Suggs also pointed to recent shifts at the very top of the naval hierarchy in support of his proposition that an era was ending. The thesis also fits in with persistent rumours that all has not been well between Admiral Gorshkov and his Defence Minister Marshal Dmitri Ustinov. If so, it may well be that Ustinov will be able to use the extra leverage that Brezhnev's replacement by Yuri Andropov has probably given him finally to dispose of Gorshkov.

### New policies for the future?

If it is really true that Gorshkov's career is ending in some disfavour, then this raises the fascinating and important possibility that what is at issue is not just the man but the policy he represents. If this, in turn, is true it seems reasonable to expect the new man to have new policies and that the Soviet Navy of the future will take new directions that we currently do not anticipate—an unnerving prospect for naval analysts and writers of recent books, myself included.<sup>2</sup>

Two arguments nevertheless support this proposition. One emerges from the nature of the criticism of Stalbo's ideas which Suggs so admirably explains. Amongst other things, Stalbo was taken to task for violating probably the Soviet Union's most cherished principle in military theory, namely that of the unity of forces. Stalbo was said to be wrong to imagine that naval theory was independent from military science as a whole and paid too little attention to the determining influence of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. In Soviet terms, these are very severe criticisms indeed and historically they have often been used as arguments against the idea that the Navy could and should develop "independent missions". In particular, Navy people from time to time have to be disciplined against trying to develop a greater capacity to control and use the sea than the Soviet authorities think either intrinsically valid or strategically necessary for the interests of the state. Some Soviet Navy people, in

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